Discuss the battle for Kursk here. Share your knowledge about:

* the leading officers of the allied an axis forces
* military strategy, wich strong decisions were made and why were these decisions the right ones
* proportion of allied and axis forces
* how long did the battle take
* casualty numbers on both sides
* striking facts in general
* etc.

In short terms, please educate your fellow boardmembers.

My husband is involved with a re enactment group who do russian WW2 and I am sure he will be most interested in this thread. I will get him to sign up and join in.

I know it's an old thread, but can anyone fill the blanks?

Operation Zitadelle ~ Battle for Kursk

On 5 July 1943 the Wehrmacht attacked with 435,000 men in fifty divisions and 2,700 tanks and assault guns. The Red Army was able to field 1,550,000 soldiers and 4,800 armored vehicles.

Hitler has repeatedly delayed an assault on the Soviet salient around Kursk, waiting for delivery of new and untested tanks. (the new Panthers & Ferdinands). The Axis now face a choice between starting with an offensive without an ounce of operational surprise, or to preserve their forces for a fighting withdrawal to the “Wotan Line” – perhaps stalemating the eastern war indefinitely. Hitler orders the attack. This will be the furthest into Russia that the German will get and the last major Axis offensive (east) for the remainder of the war.

The German lost around 56,000 men killed. The Soviet casualty figures were not released until the end of the communist regime, and comprised 250,000 killed and 600,000 wounded. They also lost 50% of their tank strength during the Kursk offensive.

The battle was not a clear-cut victory for the Soviets who had suffered much higher casualties than the Germans. The Germans however had for the first time lost substantial territories during summer and had not been able to achieve their goals. A new front had opened in Italy diverting their attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully, not to mention the very substantial help they got from American lend-lease, including the very efficient jeeps and trucks that many say made the counter-offensive at Kursk possible. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk.

Well, I checked my sources about the Battle Of Kursk and found this:

On July 5th, 1943 the german Wehrmacht launched its last offensive in Russia between the cities of Orel and Belgorod (a frontline of about 100 miles). The germans sent into battle

From the north: Army Group Center (Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge):
9th Army, commanded by Generaloberst Model,
2nd Tank Army, commanded by General Schmidt,
Total 7 Tank Divisions, 2 Panzergrenadier Divisions, 9 Infantry Divisions and 740 airplanes

From The South: Army Group South (Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein):
4th Tank Army, commanded by Generaloberst Hoth, with 7 Tank Divisions, 7 Infantry Divisions, 1 SS-Tank Corps and 1,100 airplanes.

This made a total amount of 900,000 men, 1,840 planes, 10,000 pieces of artillery, 800 assault guns and 2,000 tanks including 205 tanks Mark V "Panther" and 90 tanks Mark VI "Tiger". These tanks are 70 percent of all german tanks in service in Russia in summer 1943.

The opposing forces were:

North:
The "Central Front" commanded by Army General Rokossovskij

South:
The "Voronezh Front" commanded by Army General Watutin

The soviet forces consisted of 10 Tank Corps and 5 Infantry Corps with a total of 1,350,000 men, 4,000 tanks and assault guns, 20,000 pieces of artillery and 2,600 airplanes.

After german and italian forces had surrendered to the allied in Northern Africa in may 1943 Hitler needed desperately a success in Russia. So he ordered to attack at Kursk where german supreme command seized a chance to encircle large numbers of soviet troops (just like in 1941).

Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht the Soviets became aware of the german plans and prepared themselves very well for the attack. The soviets digged more than 9,000 kilometers (5,600 miles) of trenches and built large mine fields with about 2,400 mines each mile of frontline.

In the evening of July 4th, 1943 some intelligence reports arrived at the soviet HQ. Now the soviet generals knew about place and time of the german attack. Instantly the soviet artillery opened fire.

On July 5th, 1943 at 0500 local time the german 4th Tank Army attacked from the south to the north. After five days of heavy fighting with high casualties on both sides the attack was stopped. Up to July 10th the germans advanced only 32 kilometers (20 miles).

The attack of the german 9th Army from the north to the south was even worse. Here the germans advanced only 10 kilometers (6 miles).

On July 11th the Red Army counter-attacked. One day later the german 4th Tank Army and the soviet 5th Guards Tank Army met in battle at Prokhorovka - a real clash of titans. 850 soviet tanks versus 500 german tanks (including 100 Tanks Mark V "Panther" and Mark VI "Tiger").

On July 13th Hitler ordered to stop all operations at Kursk. At that time US and British forces entered Sicily/Italy. And the Soviets launched Operation Bagration northern and southern of Kursk to encircle the german forces. This was the end of all german offensive strategy in Russia.

Casualties were high on both sides. The germans suffered a loss of more than 30,000 dead and wounded, 34,000 MIA (mostly POW) and hundreds of tanks (during the battle of Prokhorovka the Wehrmacht lost over 400 tanks). The germans were not able to replace that losses of tanks until the end of the war.

The Red Army specified its own losses: 35,000 dead, 17,500 MIA (mostly POW) and more than 1,500 tanks.

In the late 1990s Russia opened military archives to the public. According to this new sources the Red Army suffered 250,000 dead, 600,000 wounded and 33,000 MIA (POW) and lost 2,100 tanks.

Greetz
Bremm

Of the tanks at Kursk fielded by the Germans a majority were late-model Mark IV's, while the Germans did field about 500 Panthers and Tiger I's,they were not in a sufficient number to make a difference that Hitler had wanted, and also some Germans were fighting in captured T-34s.

As a direct response to the T-34, as well as to replace the Mark III and Mark IV tanks, the Panzerkampwfagen V Panther was produced during 1943. In design, the tank was modeled after some of the advantages of the Soviet T-34 like it's sloping armor,which gave much improved shot deflection and also increased the apparent armor thickness against penetration, the wide track and large road wheels which improved mobility over soft ground, and the long, over-hanging gun. The two companies designing, designated VK3002, the Panther was Daimler-Benz and Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG and were tasked to get the proposed models out by April of '42. Following to the date, each companies' model was different. Daimler-Benz produced a model that had many of the T-34's attributes, while the MAN design was more of a German thinking engineering models, but still kept some of the better properties of the Russian tank. The MAN design was chosen and after a test runs in September 1942 at Kummersdorf, was officially accepted. The model produced by the Germans and used during the battle weighed about 35 tons and was powered by a 700 horsepower (520 kW), 23 litre Maybach HL 230 V-12 petrol engine.The main gun was a 75 mm Rheinmetall KwK 42 L/70 with 79 rounds supported by two MG 34 machine guns. It had a large propellent charge and long barrel, which gave it a very high muzzle velocity. The Panther had a road speed of about 46 km/h and range of 250 km.First seeing action at Kursk, it would be used on both the Eastern and Western Fronts.

Jake

Here is a nice picture of some 'Elefant' tank detroyers on the move

The Elefant/Ferdinand Tank Destroyers were, in my opinion, a waste of time to delay the assualt for. Although they were effecient tank destroyers from far away, they were very vunerable in attacks and counter-attacks involving enemy infantry with no infantry cover for themselves. The Russian infantry could easily take out the tank. This problem would later be solved with the addition of the of a bow-mounted MG34.

Jake

Jake:

I agree the Ferdinands were vulnerable to infantry attack. During Kursk their crews were reduced to firing machine guns through the barrel of the main gun to try to hold off Russian infantry. But "easily" does not convey the problem faced by an infantry unit of that era (in any army) in combat with a group of armored vehicles with 80 mm of armor on the flanks and rear of their hulls. The Russian infantry units had nothing that could penetrate it at any range. Their options were: break a track with mines or satchel charges, immobilizing (but not destroying) the vehicle; set off an explosive charge in contact with the armor, in hope that the shock would spall the armor inside the vehicle and sent flakes flying around the interior; pour burning gasoline on it in hopes that its fuel would ignite or that the crew would be suffocated or cooked; or find an opening and fire a weapon into the vehicle, hoping to disable the crew. When you send infantry on tasks like that, it is more efficient to issue purple hearts with the orders.

The Ferdinands were the brainchikd of Dr. Ferdinand Porsche, and are sometimes referred to as "Porsche Tigers." In addition to being virtually invulnerable to antitank fire, they mounted the same 71 caliber 88 mm gun that was put in the Tiger II (Tiger I had a 56 caliber 88). This gun could penetrate 132 mm of armored plate at 2000 meters with standard AP ammunition (153mm with tungsten-carbide core ammunition). The downside was that the gun had only 28 degrees of traverse; beyond that, you had to turn the whole vehicle. Only 90 ferdinands were produced. Their record at Kursk was the reason no more were made. Those that survived the battle fought until late '43, when the 48 survivors were withdrawn and modified as you stated.

The Ferdinands were not the only disappointment for the Germans. Like all new machines, the Panthers encountered "teething" problems. These are normally discovered and corrected in the course of pre-acceptance trials, but no such trials were conducted for the Panthers. Accordingly, their teething problems came to light during the battle. (More purple hearts!) Unlike the Ferdinand, however, the Panther's problems were correctable, and it became probably the best medium tank of the war.

"Lucy" was a soviet spy somewhere in the German high command. He betrayed the Kursk attack to the Soviets in time for them to pour troops into the area and fortify their lines to a depth of nearly 20 miles. The Soviets also used "Lucy"'s information to plan a devastating attack on the Luftwaffe airfields just as the aircraft were about to take off to support the offensive. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the Germans had established a "Freya" radar set at the airfields. The approaching formations were reported, the German fighters scrambled, and the Soviet attack was broken up with heavy losses, impairing their ability to provide ground support during the battle. Also, 4th panzer army achieved a small tactical surprise. Feeling that its present positions were not suitable to commence the offensive, they conducted an attack the afternoon before the offensive was to commence which siezed the first Soviet line of defenses on the southern flank. This decision was made at Army level, so "Lucy" was not privy to it. So far as I am aware, "Lucy" has never been identified.

Mike

True, but by that time, and indefintely during Kursk, attached to the infantry and armored regiments was one anti-tank rifle company and anti-tank battery distrubuted throughout each battalion. Assuminly, since it was a well-coordinated defense, most units from company and up would be able synchronize its assets to defend against the armor and tank destroyers they were going up against.



The 71 caliber '88' was the longer and more powerful version of the '88' than the Tiger I's version,and although it was on of the same guns on the a variations of one of the 'flak' '88' it fired a different, longer cartridge giving it some more range and even more 'punch'.

Jake

Is "Lucy" Rudolf Rossler? My source is the World War 2 Magazine printed by ORBIS 1984 volume 13.

Opposition to the plan.

Colonel - General Guderian was strongly opposed to Operation "Zitadelle" as were others namely Model and Mellenthin. Had Hitler accepted their argument and cancelled the operation it could have put D Day in serious jeopardy of success as pointed out by Guderian in his memoirs.

"I asked permission to express my views and declared that the attack was pointless; we had only just completed the reorganisation and re equipment of the Eastern Front; if we attacked according to the plan of the Chief of the General Staff we were certain to suffer heavy tank casualties, which we would not be in a position to replace in 1943; on the contrary, we ought to be devoting our new tank production to the Western Front so as to have mobile reserves available for use against the Allied landing which could be expected with certainty to take place in 1944. Furthermore, I pointed out that the Panthers, on whose performance the Chief of the General Staff was relying so heavily, were still suffering from many teething problems inherent in all new equipment and it seemed unlikely that these could be put right in time for the launching of the attack."

Thank goodness Hitler didn't listen!!!

Ian

Corporal Hitlers' Order No 16.

"I am resolved as soon as the weather allows, to launch Operation "Zitadelle", as the first offensive action this year. Hence the importance of this offensive. It must lead to a rapid and decisive success. It must give us the initiative for the coming spring and summer. In view of this, preparations must be conducted with the utmost precaution and the utmost energy. At the main points of attack the finest units, the finest commmanders will be committed, and plentiful supplies of munitions will be ensured. Every commander, every fighting man must be imbued with the capital significance of this offensive. The victory of Kursk must be as a beacon to the whole world.

To this effect, I order:

1. Objective of the offensive: by means of a highly concentrated and savage attack vigorously conducted by two armies, one from the area of Belgorod, the other from south of Orel, to encircle the enemy forces situated in the region of Kursk and annihilate them by concentric attacks.

In the course of this offensive a new and shorter front line will be established, permitting economy of means, along the line joining Nejega, Korocha, Skorodnoye, Tim, passing east of Shchigry and Sosna."

2.a. to ensure to the full the advantage of surprise, and principally to keep the enemy ignorant of the timing of the attack.

b. to concentrate to the utmost the attacking forces on narrow fronts so as to obtain an overwhelming local superiority in all arms (tanks, assault guns, artillery, and rocket launchers) grouped in a single echelon until junction between the two armies in the rear of the enemy is effected, thereby cutting him off from his rear areas;

c. to bring up as fast as possible, from the rear, the forces necessary to cover the flanks of the offensive thrusts, thus enabling the attacking forces to concentrate solely on their advance;

d. by driving into the pocket from all sides and with all possible speed, to give the enemy no respite, and to accelerate his destruction;

e. to execute the attack at a speed so rapid that the enemy can neither prevent encirclement nor bring up reserves from his other fronts; and

f. by the speedy establishment of the new front line, to allow the disengagement of forces, especially the Panzer forces, with all possible despatch, so that they can be used for other purposes."

As from April 28th Kluge and Manstein were to be ready to launch the attack within six days of receiving the order. The earliest date set was May 3rd.

13 copies were made of this order one of which was obtained by "Lucy" and Hitlers plan was doomed before it even started.

Many nations had anti-tank rifles (including the British). From the first day of the war, they were useless against anything except armored cars, and most armies discarded them (unless they had nothing else to use, which was occasionally the case).

A Soviet rifle regiment contained (in addition to 54 anti-tank rifles) a battery of 12 45 mm anti-tank guns. At a range of 100 meters, these weapons could drive an AP round halfway through the Ferdinand's "thin" flank armor. A Soviet rifle division had an anti-tank battalion with (I believe) 12 76.2mm guns. These weapons could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Ferdinand at any range. They could penetrate the flank armor of the hull at 1000 meters, and the flank armor of the superstructure at 500 meters -- if they got a straight shot! (Armor penetration for the 76.2 was 98mm at 100 meters, 90mm at 500 meters, and 82mm at 1000 meters. The Ferdinand had 80mm of armor plate on its flanks and rear, with the superstructure sloped at 30 degrees. Slope increases the apparent thickness of the armor; any deviation from a perpendicular shot will do so as well.) These divisions also had 12 122 mm gun-howitzers and 24 76.2 mm field guns (essentially identical to the anti-tank gun) in its divisional artillery. The rifle divisions had no tanks or assault guns, although an Army might have two or three battalions of SU 76s, a lightly armored vehicle mounting the 76.2 mm AT gun. The Soviets also employed Motorized Anti-tank regiments (six 4 gun batteries) and Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments (four 5 vehicle companies), generally fielded as components of brigades which could be attached to front-line armies. But these also were armed with 76.2 mm guns -- the SU85, which was the next Soviet self-propelled gun, didn't enter production until late 1943.

It was all up to the Soviet grunts -- and to their credit, they did not shrink from the task. But God, did they pay the price!

Mike

Yes and no,both versions of the Soviet anti-tank rifle the PTRD and PTRS, both 14.5mm and the first a single-shot while the latter had a five-round clip, could penetrate almost all early German armor, inlcuding the Panzer Mark IV, which was the main battle tank for the Germans at Kursk, and some armored vehicles of the later German Army, but for the anti-tank rifles to make a difference against thick-armored tanks like the Tiger and Ferdinand, the riflemen usually shot for a weak-spot or portholes in the tank. Useless, it was not, even until the latter years, it would be mixed in with the lend-lease American bazookas.

From a Red Star publication during the war:

A Soviet artillery battery was on the march when the column was suddenly attacked by six enemy tanks. A Red Army private armed with an antitank rifle jumped off a caisson, took position behind a mound, and opened fire. He inflicted sufficient damage on the leading tank to cause the remainder of the enemy tanks to delay their attack for a few minutes. The battery was given a chance to deploy and open fire, and the surprise attack was beaten off. Four of the six German tanks were put out of action. *

Jake

*http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ru_antitank/index.html

Good stuff Jake and Mike.

The weak spots targeted were indeed the rear and flanks of the German tanks however what is staggerring is the figures involved.

To stop 1800 German tanks weak spots or not it required 3600 Soviet tanks, 6000 anti-tank weapons and 400,000 mines. Monumental statistics.

Ian

Here is a very good site on the air forces involved from both sides: http://www.gray.serveftp.com/kursk/

This one is very good for the whole battle, ground and air, although it hasn't been updated recently - I think last update was in 1999: http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/ It has a very nice map to get a view of the situation. Also it has orders of battle for ground and air, very nice TO&E, a table of Russian AFV strengths by unit, etc. One final note is a sources section if one wants to find further information as well as from where the web site data was gathered.

I found this one recently on the strenghts by unit for German AFVs and a German order of battle: http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/kursktanks.html

However the most important source of intelligence for GRU proved to be "LUCY".LUCY serviced the Soviet spy network which operated from neutral country Switzerland .The network dubbed "DIE ROTE DREI"(The Red Three) was erected by GRU agent ,a Hungarian map maker Sandor Rado ,whose call name was DORA.LUCY was Rudolf Rossler, a German refugee publisher living in Lucerne,Harsh treatment meted out by Alfred Rosenberg who seized his profitable theatre company made him a rabid anti-nazi.Rossler alias LUCY ,whose identity was to remain secret long after the war had ended ,received information from sources in German High Command (OKW).

Source "The Red Orchestra" The Soviet Spy Network inside Nazi Europe by V E Tarrant.

Sorry to batter on re the Soviet espionage but this was crucial to setting up the Russian defences and subsequent counter offensive.

Such was the intelligence by radio from "Lucy" in Lucerne that in a memo of the period it appears Stalin believed he had 210 enemy divisions excluding Finns facing him. The official OKW record of July 7 of that year gives 210 exactly, plus 5 regiments. On top of that a deserter from the Sudeten division on July 4 revealed zero hour for the operation to the Russians.

Thanks to "Lucy's" detailed intelligence the Russians had time to organise their defences thanks mainly to Hitler's delays and did so to a depth of 16 and 25 miles. By use of minefields the German armour would be channelled into "Anti tank fronts" solidly defended with anti-tank guns. Such was the strength of the defence that it surpassed the offensive potential of the Germans. Figures vary as to the amount of Russian armour, anti tank guns etc but it was clearly superior to that of the Germans.

With the defences in place and everything known about Operation "Zitadelle" including the position of supply columns, the chain of command, reinforcements and zero hour the Russians simply had to wait confident of victory.

The Germans were aware of the build up of deep defensive positions at the very points where they would attack. This was largely based on aerial photography which Model had produced and Model had suggested that they abandon the idea. Hitler in his wisdom would have none of it and "Zitadelle" went ahead. Hitler received opposition re his plan from Guderian, Manstein, Model and Mellenthin and being the military genius we all know he was he ignored them all.

Great links, Paul!



The Kursk salient was a remnant of von Manstein's February counter-offensive, which got bogged down in the mud after taking Belgorod. Initially he favored the offensive -- but wanted to jump off in April, as soon as the ground dried out and his tanks could maneuver. By May he considered success doubtful. Model was also against pursuit of the OKW plan, in view of the obvous Soviet preparations to defeat it. Guderian, the Inspector-General of Armored Forces, was adamantly opposed to the attack, foreseeing that the recently rebuilf Panzer forces would suffer losses that could not be replaced within the confines of his reorganization plan and German productive capacity. Keitel, on the other hand, insisted that it was "politically necessary" to conduct an offensive that summer, and that the new Tiger and Panther tanks would provide enough combat power to overcome Soviet resistance. Guderian pointed out that the Panthers were not ready for combat yet, and probably could not be made ready by that summer. Manstein also raised the possibility that further delays would have the operation conducted at the same time as a western invasion of Europe. While Hitler vacilated (and confided to Guderian that the thought of the operation made his stomach churn), he eventually ordered the operation carried out in early July. (Von Mellenthin, who was Chief of Staff of 48th panzer Corps at the time, had no contact with Hitler.)

Ninth Army's attack from the north penetrated about eleven miles in six days of heavy fighting, but was then stopped by a Soviet defense line on commanding terrain. Its plan to continue the attack was frustrated when other Soviet forces launched an offensive aimed at its rear, requiring a substantial diversion of mobile forces to meet the threat. Army Group South, employing Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detatchment Kempf, in the same six day period, managed at heavy cost to hack its way completely through the Soviet defensive belts. According to von Manstein, during the first six days of Citadel, his Army Group captured 24,000 Soviet prisoners, and destroyed 1800 Soviet tanks, 267 artillery pieces and 1080 anti-tank guns (these figures seem generous, and he doesn't mention his own losses). A counterattack at Prokorovka by the Fifth Tank Army against the II SS Panzer Corps was beaten off -- but at that point, Hitler ordered the operation suspended. The Allied landings on Sicily had caused a change of government in Italy, and forces (particularly including II SS Panzer Corps) were needed to provide an army to defend that country.

On the other side, Zhukov controled the defense as Stavka representative and did his usual highly competent job, coordinating the efforts of the Voronezh, Central and Steppe Fronts. Another prominent participant was the Political Commisar for the Voronezh Front, Nikita Khrushchev (under the Soviet command structure, each unit was commanded by a "Military Council" composed of the unit commander, his deputy and the "Member of the Military Council," as Political Commissars were called at the time. Any valid order required the signatures of two members of this council. So in a very real sense, Khrushchev was co-commander if the Front.) Zhukov claims the Germans lost 500,000 men, 2000 tanks and assault guns and 3000 guns, but these figures seem too large by at least an order of magnitude. Whatever the precise losses were, the German armored force had blunted itself irreparably, and Germany had permanently lost the initiative. Immediately after the Germans halted their operation, the Soviets began a series of offensives which would carry them into Roumania and Southern Poland before they ceased in the early spring of 1944.

One of the main focal points in the operation, Prokhorovka would be the site of the largest armoured engagement in the war.

Prokhorovka is a small village in central Russia. It is located along the Psel River southwest of the city of Kursk. As with the rest of the Russian steppe, the town is on and around a series of hills ranging from 120-250 feet high and has two major roads leading on an east-west axis, while the other goes from north to south swinging through Prokhorovka and then taking a southwesterdly turn moving through the village of Lutovo, and stopping at the village of Yamki a few km(s) southwest of Prokhorovka. Also, a railroad track coming from Kursk, hits the village from the northeast and paralells the east-west road out of Prokhorovka.Some scattered woods dot the landscape around the village, too.

During Operation Citadel, Prokhorovka was located in the Voronezh Front area. As the Germans of the II SS Panzer Corps, the armored spearhead of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, inched its way forward day by day in the relentless struggle to defeat the Soviets and meet the Ninth Army in the north to seal off the Soviet Kessel ,General Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front in the south of the 'bulge', positioned a stiff defensive action using tanks in with his infantry and guns on the prepared lines of defense consisting of anti-tank guns,mines, and machine-gun nests and bunkers. Although it caused considerable men and resources for the Germans, Vatutin also sucked up his reserves to through into the line. Katukov's First Tank Army, along with an extra two tank corps, moved up and joined the fenzy to defend the line and keep the Germans back.On the first day, even against very tough resistance, the armored spearheads of Manstein thrusted as deep as 20 kilometers deep.

On the afternoon of the 6th of July, a counterattack plan of striking the east and west flanks of the German advance was presented to Stalin's representative Vasilevsky, using fresh tank forces from Stavka's reserve, but before they could react, the Fourth Panzer Army rapid advances overcame the plan.

By the 7th, Vatutin, constantly adjusting his defenses to the German blitz, he had consumed all his reserves. He requested for more tanks, planes,and men, and was answered with a statement to hold the line and exhaust the advance at the prepared positions. Stalin did give him two tank corps, and Vatutin used them in a counterattack that unsuccessfully stopped the panzers, but slowed them temporarily. In the next few days, Vatutin and Vasilesky's advice to release additional troops to help in scomatting the advance, by releasing a tank and rifle army(5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank, which would clash with the II SS Pazner Corps at Prokorovka), was again halted by the panzer's drive, which had picked up pace and redirected itself toward the village of Prokhorovka.

Under the command of Paul Hausser, the II SS Panzer Corps, spearhead for the Fourth Panzer Army, had, until up to Prokhorovka, a series of victories and made very good headway against rugged resistance . As with many other tank units in the German armies, in consisted of a variety of panzers from the new Tiger I heavy tank to the newer Mark IV and the older Mark III models. During the operation, Hausser would use a tactic that used the fresher and stronger Tiger's as the spearhead with the IV's and III's mopping up(along with the following infantry that tailed the panzer advances), this would be known as 'Panzerkiel'. The newer Tiger I, equipped with the deadly 88-mm gun, was the cream of the crop in the German Panzer Corps and only to be rivaled by the Tiger II and King Tiger, the only Russian tank to meet up to the Tiger was the T-34(in mass numbers and close up it stood a good chance with its sloping armor and 76.2 mm gun, almost the same as the Sherman on the Western theater of Europe) and the IS-2 heavy tank big 85 mm gun, but its advantages were the extremely thick armor of 120 mm and, although being heavy and thick in armor, it was suprisingly fast.

On July the 12th, as Luftwaffe and artillery bombarded the Soviet lines, the II SS Panzer Corps was forming up into it's 'Panzerkiel'. While they were forming into their battle groups, tank crews were awestruck as masses of Soviet tank columns advanced towards their position. Although many believe that the actions around Prokhorovka was a massive tank battle between the large numbers of Tiger I and Panther tanks against the T-34s and IS-2s of the, but new information released recently shows that this idea is false(One, because the II SS Panzer Corps only had a handful of Tiger and no Panthers, and that besides the T-34s and 'Stalin's the Soviet armored formations also had British Valentines and Churchills). What proceeded was to become the largest tank engagement in World War II and in history.

For most of the day, tank units from the 18th and 29th Soviet Tank Corps, supported by various rifle divisions,battled the panzer and panzergrenadiers of the SS 'Adolf Hitler', 'Totenkopf, and 'Das Reich' divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps. In the most famous action of the day the T-70 and T-34 tanks of the Red Army's 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army charged headlong at the SS's tanks. The T34s were faster but more lightly armoured and armed - they aimed to exploit weaknesses in the German machines' armour at close range. A series of disjointed engagements went on for much of the day with high losses on both sides, although it is likely the Germans inflicted more losses than they themselves sustained.

Although not a claer-cut victory on either side, the action at Prokhorovka stopped the advance of the panzers that would of cut off the Soviet salient. Hitler called off the operation and it ended in defeat. During and at the end of the operation, the Allied troops would invade Sicily and some units including Leibstandarte division would be sent to fight the Brits and Americans on the Mediterreanean island.


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sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/II_SS_Panzer_...s#Kursk_-_Italy
http://www.isidore-of-seville.com/viewer/v...at640luxfiat348
ACG Interactive: What Next General? by: Richard Armstrong March 2006 edition
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...oleinikov_8.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...ly_12_13_43.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...oleinikov_1.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...2_Jul_09_43.gif
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...oleinikov_8.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...02_plans_43.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...ly_12_13_43.jpg
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19...prokhorovka.gif
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/maps/19..._12_16Jul43.JPG
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Prokorovka
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prokhorovka

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Jake

Okay, this is just a minor digression ...

I don't know a great deal about the Kursk battle, eastern European theatre being a bit weak for me. So I finally have paid attention to this thread.

While I've learned more about the Kursk battle, I just have to take a moment to note another aspect of this thread that has occurred to me.

Here we have IMike who admitted to being 63, even though only copping to 25 in his head (hell, for decades I've been 35!!), Ian who roves in his 40s, Paul in his 30s who posts once a quarter, and then we have Jake who at 13 has no compunction whatever taking on those guys to carry on a back and forth about history.

We ought to take a minute to celebrate that! I'm staying tuned for more info on the eastern European front and armored warfare and thank these members for presenting more information to explore. Thanks, guys! BK

I try not to speak about what I don't know. I'm an amateur WW1/WW2 military aviation enthusiast more than anything else. I can't remember how I found this forum. Maybe it was after watching BoB for the God knows what many times that I decided to see what I could learn from the internet. I'm happy that I did find this forum, though, just so I can see what's happening with Easy Company. Any way I only try to insert myself into conversations that I have something to offer and other times I do my best to listen and learn, that's why I'm a "once is a quarter" kind of guy.

Back onto Kursk...

A good book is "The Battle of Kursk" by by David M. Glantz although in some reviews I've read there are quite a lot of factual errors and perhaps he relied too much on secondary Russian sources that were not cross referenced back to the German records to see if they made sense. It is still a good read for the price but I concur with the overall feeling that it has Russian overtones. Not that these overtones are bad just that you've got to take it with a grain of salt. One of Glantz's critics, Niklas Zetterling, has his own Kursk book, "Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis" but it is pricey.

Thanks BK.



I have actuaclly read both of those books, and I concur with the reviewers and critics, that the first does have a few errors factually, but it was a good book. The latter, was an alright book, personally, I thought he did a good job.

Jake

True, however, I should have made it clear that he was against it but did not necessarily advise Hitler.

Colonel Von Mellenthin in his capacity of Chief of Staff of XLVIII Panzer Corps, which had been given an important part to play in the plans, had voiced the same opinion as Models' to General Zeitler. By holding up the offensive until a first brigade of Panther tanks had been formed, as Hitler intended, the Russians would be given time to recover from the losses inflicted on them.For this they only needed a month or two and the operation would be a far more difficult one.



I have no problem being taught history by one so young, hats off to you Jake. When I was 13 the closest I got to reading about WW2 was fictional books by Alistair Mclean e.g. The Guns Of Navarone and the Commando Booklets.

Ian

Would the variety of tanks at Kursk used by the Germans have created logisitcal problems that would have hindered the advance?

Jake

Jake,

IMO I don't think the variety of the tanks would have caused much of a problem, but I think using operationally the latest and greatest perhaps before they were put through the wringer might have. At Kursk, both north and south salients, the German army brought in Panthers, Tigers, and Ferdinands, albeit in small numbers. I think this was the first time any of those were used in combat. So a supply problem might have existed when it was time to repair these new AFVs as close to the front as possible.

However, by my estimation about 80% of the tank force was Pz IIIs and PzIVs which had been in use for years at that point. Also I think all the tanks used the same fuel and that their main armament, even those of the newest Panthers and Tigers, was similar to other units like the artillery and anti-tank units that the ammunition supply system was well established.

I think what hindered the German advance was the Russians. They weren't the push-overs that they were in most of the two previous years. They had very good equipment in good numbers, and their leaders learned from the previous mistakes. The troops had gained and learned from combat experience, too. The Russians had time to prepare a solid defense and rose to every threatening breach of that defense. Then once they had stopped the German advance they went on the offense and counterattacked. The Germans, plain and simple, got beat. No excuses, they got beat.

IMHO Jake I believe that the invasion of Sicily was the only reason Hitler called it off. I am sure he would have pressed on with his plans regardless of his losses in armour or ground.

Enjoyed that, though some of the maps are difficult to follow due to bad handwriting

IMO, I don't think Operation Husky was the only reason Hitler called of Kursk. Like you said he probably would have pressed on with his plans regardless of his losses in armour, but with his obsession with losing land in Europe he could not let his Italian allies hold Sicily and most of the Mediterreanan. Although a mix bag of an army, the Italians had either fought heriocally with their Axis counterparts or either flopped and he could not trust them with his "empire". Many of the most hardened and experienced German divisions were at Sicily like the Hermann Goring and Leibrstandarte.

Jake

Jake, the II SS Panzer Corps wasn't withdrawn to defend Sicily. Only one of its divisions, Liebstandarte, was actually sent to Italy, and it served with Rommel's Army Group B in the northern part of the country. The problem Hitler feared was the unreliability of the Italians, and he was well-informed. The invasion of Sicily caused Mussolini's government to collapse, and Il Duce was imprisoned. His successor immediately entered into secret negotiations with the allies. When an allied force was spotted sailing toward Italy itself, the Italian navy left port vowing to throw the invasion back or die trying -- instead it sailed to Malta, where it surrendered in accordance with the agreement announced as our men landed at Salerno. Meanwhile, Mussolini had been located and was rescued by Otto Skorzney; with German support he formed a new Italian government in the part of Italy still held by the Germans. Liebstandarte itself maintained a presence in Northern Italy and disarmed Italian units following the surrender; but it was then returned to the Eastern Front without seeing combat in Italy.

The German divisions which fought in Sicily were the Herman Goring Panzer Division, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (formed in Sicily from remnants of the 15th Panzer Division of Afirka Korps fame) and the 1st Parachute Division.

Mike

Hitler called his two Field Marshalls to his HQ in Rastenburg to discuss the situation regarding Kursk and the Anglo-American landings in Sicily. Kluge wanted to call the whole thing off in Russia after all the 9th Army had lost 20,000 men in a week!!!! Manstein was not so keen to call it off but needed Kluges support in his sector to pin the Russians down. According to Manstein Hitler was not very happy about the situation in Sicily as he saw this as a stepping stone for the allies to land in the south of Italy and the Balkans.To quote Hitler "Hence new armies must be formed in these areas,which means taking some troops from the Eastern Front and hence calling a halt to Zitadelle". Relief for Russia at last.

Nevertheless, the more units were taken of the Kursk line the worse the odds were for the Germans and the quicker the victory for the Soviets.

IMO, a combined German thrust to cut off the sailent once in for all would have been a reailty if the German High Staff and Hitler put all the money on the table. Many German generals already thought the war was over anyway.

If the III Panzer Corps attacked eastwards to hold units down, while the II SS Panzer Corps and the XLVIII Panzer Corps attacked together northwards. While the LII,VII,XIII Corps advance and hold down units in the bulge of the Kursk salient, a 90 degree turn by the XLVIII Panzer Corps to link up and cut off the 38th and 40th Russian Armies would acheived a massive Russian casualties and then with a combined effort of the units in the cutoff to help fight down and outflank remaining units in the bulge.

As all this is happening, in the north, the Ninth Army attacks in the east with the XXIII,XXXV,LIII corps holding down units and advancing and south and southwesternly direction with the XLI,XLVI,XLVII Panzer Corps to mirror what the southern attack had down.

This whole attack would cause panic in the Central Front ,with the Steppe Front coming to help causing a weaken along the rest of the line allowing advances by different German units south of the salient.

This is all in theory if the Germans would of been able to allocate support by the Luftwaffe,artilllery,and engineers to help along the way and the logistics for bringing up the needed gas,ammunition, and food for the advancing army.

Also weather would have to be in almost perfect conditions for this theoretical advance to have occured.

And even if the German victory had of been achieved, the losses would have probably been to great to replace unless the captured men and material would have been used to help in this process.But this would have only have helped a little.

On the other hand, the Russians who in the historical outcome did lose more men,tanks,planes, and equipment, would of still lost more in the theory. They would have been able to replace it much,much easier than their German counterpart.

Jake

However, 9th Army could not maintain pressure on the north flank of the salient. In addition to being stopped cold in the middle of the Soviet fortifications, there was a strong Russian attack being aimed at Orel. Army Group Center had to pull forces out of the Kursk battle to contain (not halt) this offensive.

In the south, II SS Panzer Corps was through the Soviet fortifications. III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf was comming up on its right flank, while on its left, XLVIII Panzer Corps was almost through. The Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army had tried to plug the hole in the fortifications; and while they had held back II SS Panzer Corps advance, they had been repulsed.

IMO, the offensive should have been allowed to continue. There were other sources for garrison forces for Italy, and the Whermacht had taken too much damage to have their forces halted just when they were on the verge of some success. I don't think any large-scale encirclement was still possible, for the north face of the salient was still almost 60 miles away, and the Soviet armies showed no signs of breaking under the German pressure. Once free of the fortified belts, the German Panzer divisions could have employed the maneuver warfare at which they excelled -- and at which the Soviets were at a serious disadvantage. The Germans had to hurt the Soviet army, inflict enough damage on it that it could not conduct an offensive that summer. Whether this could have been done or not is another question, but it certainly should have been attempted.

Mike

Agreed. A large-scale encirclement was unlikely, but IMO the Germans in the south, had they broken through, could have caused almost panic behind the lines of Russian units in the Voronezh Front. This would have achieved somewhat of a victory in that: the Germans would of either captured or killed a high number of Russian men and matariel from the 40th and 38th Armies and would of caused considerable scare among units north of them and in around the salient.

Now if this would of caused a mass retreat by the Russian armies in the NW part of the salient, I would have to disagree on behalf of the disciplinary actions of the Russian commanders.As you said the northern attack was held down and the unlikely vision of the southern German attack going straight and completing the encirclement would be slim to none.

Jake