A map of 7th armoured advance to Villers

http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/normandy/villersbocage.htm


Operation Epsom: Attempt to Outflank Caen
June 24 - July 1, 1944
http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/normandy/epsom44.htm

Allied Capture of Caen
July 7-9, 1944
http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/normandy/caen44.htm

Ive always thought along the lines of some historians, not the ones who are pandering to a "wider" audience and who are wanting to make a name for themselves on tv and across the atlantic, that too much has been made about how much ground was taken, and not enough on how much damage was caused to the Germans. 7th armoured despite setbacks along with with 50th div, fought hard. Bayerlein the very experienced commander of PZ Lehr said after these recent battles with the 7th and 50th, that "my chance to drive to the sea was lost. We had lost about a hundred tanks against the British"

To put that into context the Americans never saw more than 190 tanks at one time on their whole front.

Also the mood at German HQ was terrible, Monty's plans were working as Von Rundstedt and Rommel both sent Hitler reports saying that things were not good, German armour was having to be used for defense, reinforcements as they arrived were being steadily destroyed piecemeal as they were put into the line. The two German commanders were telling Hitler what Monty had already predicted. Even more desperate reports from the front made Hitler fly to meet his commanders on the 17th June at Margival near Soissons.

After the meeting with Rommel reinforcements were on the way, but Monty knew that the German lines were starting to creak, he issued a new directive on the 18th stating that " We must now capture Caen and Cherbourg as the first step in the full development of our plans". The Americans had cut right across the Contentin and were closing on Cherbourg and the capture of Caen was to have a supporting attack East of the Orne and a major outflanking attack by the newly arrived 8 corps which was to seize the high ground South of Caen at Bretteville sur Laize and gain control of the exits from the city. Trouble was 2nd army was short of men, there had been many delays in getting men and supplies ashore. 2 brigades short of what should have been ashore turned into 3 divisions by the 22nd June.

Then the great storm struck, the worst in 40 years, just as Monty was to launch his attack on Caen and just when Rommel was desperate for reinforcements. 800 craft were left shattered and stranded, 2 1/2 miles of steel roadway sunk, ferries, breakwaters, and blockships destroyed or damaged and so on.

Aha, I see Epsom has surfaced. Time to drag myself to the bookshelf.

Interestingly, the initial plan for Epsom was to launch VIII Corps from the far-left of the British area - the Orne Bridgehead. This plan was dropped as that bridgehead lacked room for a major attack.


B. L. Montgomery Normandy to the Baltic

Interesting when you consider Goodwood was launched from the Orne bridgehead.

Instead the operations on the left-flank were toned down to just a diversionary effort by I Corps, with the main thrust being delivered to the west of Caen by VIII Corps.

The objective of Epsom was to seize the ground to the south-east of Caen, the Caen - Falaise plain, around Bourguebus. This would isolate Caen from the south and either encircle the defenders (the Second Army Ops makes a reference to I Corps "clearing up the Caen pocket" after the advance of VII Corps) or force them to withdraw. The routing of the attack would involve the capture crossings over the Odon River, the high ground to the south of the Odon (Hill's 112 and 113) and crossings over the Orne. Montgomery hoped for the operation to be launched on June 18th, but it was put back to the 22nd and then further postponed to June 26th.

The reason for the postponements was the weather, and that the rate of Build-Up was behind schedule. On June 19th, before the storm, the British build-up was already two Brigades behind schedule. By the time the storm died down on the 22nd, the build-up had slipped to three Divisions behind schedule (figures from Victory in The West).

VIII Corps was commanded by Lt Gen Richard O'Connor. An experienced General with a very good reputation dating back to the desert campaigns of 1941, when he routed the Italians in North Africa. Had he not been taken prisoner (later escaping) he may well have been the one in charge of 21st Army Group. VIII Corps started to arrive on June 15th, and consisted of three untested Divisions - the 15th Scottish Division, the 43rd Wessex Division and the 11th Armoured Division.

The plan for Epsom called for an advance in stages, the initial attack being made by 15th (S) Div from a start-line running between Norrey-en-Bessin and Le Mesnil Patry. The division were to advance with two brigades forward to the Odon River, where they were to seize river crossings and form a bridgehead over the river. Next, 11th Armoured were to pass through the bridgehead, seize Hill 112 and then capture the river crossings over the Orne. 43rd Wessex were to remain in reserve, to be used "if required".

However, it wasn't a one Corps attack - XXX Corps, on the right of VIII Corps were to mount a preparatory attack to seize the Rauray spur. This high ground overlooks the Epsom battlefield from the start line to the Odon valley and its retention by the German's would mean that VIII Corps would be advancing overlooked by the enemy (though, when I visited the area, the view wasn't that impressive - we're not talking towering hills here, just a gentle gradient, but excellent if you have an 88mm, a Spandau and a pair of binoculars). So, to capture the spur 49th Division were to attack south, seize the town of Fontenay-le-Pesnel and then proceed onto the spur. This attack, codenamed Operation Martlet, was set for June 25th - the day before Epsom.

And, had Epsom achieved it's goals of reaching the Orne, then there would have been advances in the XXX Corps and I Corps in sympathy with Epsom. For example XXX Corps were to move alongside VIII and seize ground south of Villers Bocage. Basically, the other formations were to continue to carry out their orders from the pre D-Day briefings, which would both enlarge and strengthen the British lodgement - and keep the flank of the First Army secure.

Thanks for the input Mat



I like it when my claims are backed up although I have to admit my source had sourced your source

Although Epsom did not achive the goals as set out, as Mat mentions, one thing did happen, the defeat of the German armour. After Epsom the Germans were never again able to mount a proper attack by massed armour if you exclude Hitlers looney Mortain offensive.

Again, territorial gains were not the main thing to come out of Epsom, the truth lies in the signals coming out at the time from German army group B and the Panzer corps plus the German divisional commanders. The threat created by Epsom made the Germans thow all their armour locally available into into the line to defend the bulge that 8 and 30 corps had made. Forces surrounding this bulge were 12 SS, 1 SS, 10 SS, 9 SS (the two latter were just brought into line from the Russian front as part of 2 SS panzer corps) 2 SS, and Panzer Lehr. Also on 2nd armies front were 21st 2 Panzer.

Ronald Lewin / Montgomery page 205

" Yet Montgomery, following the strategy whichhe concieved to be correct, had so far intentionally manoeuvred in Normandy to bring the wholepower of the Panzers against his own national army, a irreplacable army. For this he recieved at the time and has since recieved much criticism. When it was not born of malice or pique, however. much of this criticism can be traced to incomprehension.

The incomprehension grew from a failure to understand that Montgomery was not a newspaper editor or a prime minister. He was not, at bottom, interested in capturing ground or towns for their own sake, to make a good showing in the press next morning or a good mark up on a map in Whitehall. Like a chess palyer, he would make a gambit or even accept a rebuff with the equanimity of a man who has a long term plan in mind. His critics, and some of his superiors, soon began and continued to clamour for short term successes which would have an immediate popularity. In case of the Americans the misunderstandings was - to a degree - venial. The subtle and indirect are not normal characteristics of the American military mind, which tends to pay lip service to Stonewall Jackson but to follow Grant in practice. This was Eisenhowers instinct, 'everybody attacks all the time' and inspite of his disclaimers it is doubtful whether he ever grasped the deviosu, long term character of Montgomery's strategy. In his heart the fall of Caen would signify more than the containing of the German armour. As late as 1948, when he published crusade in Europe, he was still writing " asthe days wore on after the initial landing the particular dissatisfaction of the press was directed toward the lack of progress on our left. Naturally I and all of my service commanders and staff were greatly concerned about this static situation near Caen. Every possible means of breaking the deadlock was considered and I repeatedly urged Montgomery to speed up ans intensify his efforts to the limit. Montgomery threw in attack after attack, gallantly conducted and heavily supported by artillery and air, but German resistance was not crushed."

But for example on the 15th June tanks facing US 1st army was 70. Tanks facing British 2nd army was 520.
30th June tanks facing US 1st army was 140. Tanks facing British 2nd army was 725. This is pretty much the same throught June and July.

Add to all this when von Rundstedt returned from the conference with Hitler he had a document waiting for him saying that von Schweppenburg of panzer group west and Hausser of 7th army wanted to withdraw to the South. This was after Hitler had just stated that no withdrawl would be made. Von Rundstedt immediately on his own authority authorised Rommel to prepare for a retreat from Caen. He sent orders also to OKW with a covering letter fully endorsing his decision. But OKW sent Von Rundstedt a signal saying that posistions are to be held, and that the next day he would be replaced by von Kluge. As well as von Rundstedt Schweppenburg was replaced by Eberbach.

Montgomery's plans had seen the replacing of 2 very senior and experienced Gewrman commanders. Rommel was not far behind.

On the last day of Epsom, Keitel: 'what shall we do? what shall we do? von Rundstedt: Make peace you fools, what else can you do?"

Operation Martlet

Part One of Epsom involved the securing the Rauray Spur, which overlooked the Epsom battlefield. So on June 25th, 49th Division went into battle to capture the high ground and anchor the right flank of the VIII Corps attack scheduled for the next day.

From the British Official History:


Quoted from Victory In The West: Volume 1 page 277. Maj L. F. Ellis

These rather bland lines in the official history make light of some of the fighting in Fontenay that day. The 11th Royal Scots Fusiliers lost 201 men in the small village. The men of 12th SS had fortified the farmhouses, and some had to be demolished by AVRE's. The village was defended by III/26th SS Regt, with support from a company of MkIV tanks. Later in the day, the German's added a force of Panthers to defend the town. At one point German infantry and tanks launched a counter-attack from the east of Fontenay, two tanks were knocked out by anti-tank guns, but the Germans responded and destroyed one of the guns. A tank was called, which promptly knocked out the remaining enemy tank and the infantry retired.


49th Division Intelligence Summary, quoted from 12th SS by Hubert Meyer

At the same time on the right of the Polar Bears attack, three battalions of 146th Brigade advanced towards Tessel Woods. This attack fell on part of the front held by Panzer Lehr Division, and after some fighting both the Lincolns and the Hallams secured their objectives - Le Bas de Fontenay, although when the Hallams tried to link up with the Scots in the eastern part of Fontenay, they were rebuffed. The 1/4th KOYLI (Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) advanced over a mile or so of open ground under mortar fire, to seize Tessel Woods. Although the woods were unoccupied and the battalion were able to dig-in, they were counter-attacked by tanks and infantry but managed to fight them off, although they lost several tanks in the process.

In the evening, the 7th Duke of Wellington's Regiment (DWR) were sent into Fontenay-le-Pesnel to continue clearing it. Progress was made, was the enemy still remained in some of the southern portions of the village by the time the attack was halted.

Although Martlet wasn't halted, and 49th Division would continue advancing south over the next few days, the resistance on the first day meant that the Rauray Spur would be in enemy hands when VIII Corps launched Operation Epsom on June 26th.

EDIT: Here's a map by Mat's Crappy Paint Map's Ltd, which might make this blur of place names a bit more understandable. Or it'll confuse even more. Any questions/criticisms? It's only a map of June 25th - I've put on a few arrows to show the direction of the VIII Corps attack on the 26th, just to hopefully put things in context.

http://img48.imageshack.us/img48/385/copyofepsom3xm.jpg

The brown shading shows land over 100m. Or is it feet? Oh, I don't know anymore.


Books:
Operation Epsom - Tim Saunders
Victory In The West - L. F. Ellis
The 12th SS - Hubert Meyer
Steel Inferno - Michael Reynolds
Breaking The Panzers - Kevin Baverstock

Your figures agree with my source.

June 15 Americans faced 70 tanks 0 panzer divisions the British faced 520 tanks and 4 Panz Div.

June 20 Americans faced 210 tanks 1 Panzer Div the British 430 tanks and 4 Panzer Div

June 25 Americans faced 190 tanks 1 Panzer Div the British 530 tanks and 5 Panzer Divs

June 30 Americans faced 140 tanks 0.5 Panzer Div the British 725 tanks and 7.5 Panzer Divs

July 5 Americans faced 215 tanks 0.5 Panzer Div the British 690 tanks and 7.5 Panzer Divs

July 10 Americans faced 190 tanks 2 Panzer Div the British 610 tanks and 6 Panzer Divs

July 15 Americans faced 190 tanks 2 Panzer Divs the British 560 tank and 6 Panzer Divs

July 20 Americans faced 190 tanks and 3 Panzer Divs the British 645 tanks and 5 Panzer Divs

A lot of criticism was aimed at Monty for being too cautious due to the apparent slow progress of the British and Canadian forces. The reason is evident in the amount of armour facing the British which was getting stronger rather than weaker. The press too were hungry for success and news of towns liberated and objectives met and all this added to the criticisms aimed at Monty. Not fair, the British were up against a strong and well disciplined resisting force which was getting stronger and better as the days wore on.

Besides Ian, Monty is hardly going to say to the press "now listen here old chaps, we are not slow at all our plan is to hold the bulk of the German forces here while the Americans breakout there".

Not to mention Bradley who wrote this in his book



Bradley

"Monty was spending his reputation in a bitter siege of Caen. Had we attempted to exonerate Monty by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting them towards Caen, we would have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the Germans to believe that Caen was the main objective."



Its jumping ahead but I just want to show how things get read wrongly. The person who did not get what was going on at times was Ike, Monty sent him a letter of what he was going to do during Goodwood but Ike took it the wrong way. If Ike didnt get the idea then why the hell would the back stabbing RAF chiefs who were brown nosing Ike at Shaef get it as well. They were all too busy trying to impress the boss.

Does anyone read into Montys orders that Goodwood was a major breakout? of course if things went well then you take advantage.


source - The pendulum of battle by Chris Dunphie ex army


Montgomery by Ronald Lewin

I have been searching the net for info on Goodwood, Epsom, Bluecoat etc for the last few weeks and ordered some books on the subject. While looking I found this site by Wolverhampton University re a field trip to Normandy taking in D DAY, Goodwood, Epsom, Hill 112 and the Falaise Pocket. It is quite good with some interesting accounts although the author is of the belief that Caen was the main objective. The site is quite old now but worth a look and has a few good maps and pics of monuments.

http://www.strategos.demon.co.uk/D-Day/News.htm

Caen was the main objective of Epsom. Or did you mean something else....?

Montgomery needed Caen if he ever wanted to leave Normandy. He also knew it was the most vulnerable part of the planned bridgehead - it was closer to the Seine, closer to Germany and closer to the German reserves around the Pas de Calais. He wanted it as a route out of Normandy, and by securing it he would cut the road network, making life harder for the German's.

When Caen wasn't captured on D-Day, and two Panzer Divisions moved to defend it with a third south of Bayeux, Montgomery decided against making a direct assault - figuring he could capture it by outmanouvering the enemy. It was a gamble that failed at Villers Bocage - anyway, it's doubtful that with the forces at his disposal, a direct assault on Caen at this stage would have worked.

Besides, as long as the German's moved the bulk of their armour to defend Caen, he would be fulfilling his purpose of securing the American flank while they cleared Cherbourg and moved south. So even though he was unable to capture the city when he wanted Caen still fulfilled its purpose, but it still needed to be captured if the Allies wanted to leave the bridgehead.

Although Epsom wasn't a direct assault, it was supposed to make the German's give the city up.

What Mat said.......

Mat, my Grandad used to say that Caen had become something so big in the minds of the British in Normandy that they weren't prepared to entertain not capture it, given that they had put so much effort into trying ever since they had landed on Norman soil on D-Day. It was 'a mission to the death' as he put it...I'm sure he can't have been alone in thinking that either. Then, when they did finally capture Caen, what a great victory for them mentally as well as strategically.

Vicky

As you correctly state it wasn't a direct assault. IMHO Monty wanted to tie up the bulk of the German armour to allow the Americans to move round from the west. In other words to keep Jerry busy. I agree it was necessary to take Caen but the main objective in my view was to surround Caen keeping the German armour in the east. Caen would eventually fall but a quick capture if at all possible (probably very costly) may have forced the Germans to retreat or regroup making any further progress by the Americans and the British very difficult, and we may not have had the relative success of capturing so many in the Falaise pocket. After all the Germans were getting pretty expert in defending. Other than that what you said



What Andy said.....

I dont agree with Monty's (shock horror) idea about getting into open tank country, I think he was wrong about that idea. I think Goodwood proved that our armour was no match in open countryside for the German 88, Tiger tank and most other AT weapons they employed. I know speed and numbers might have played a part, but again look at Goodwood. I think the way it turned out was for the better, if we had got beyond Caen into open country against those several SS and panzer divs it might have been a different story. Just my thoughts.

Ian you mentioned the press being hungry for gains, to right, its why they got so excited about Patton when he was making his way through the countryside devoid of enemy armour. It looked bloody marvellous on the maps with big arrows showing this and that, but it wasnt doing anything in the destruction of the German army. That was taking place around Caen enabling the great Patton to go swanning off.

They all bang on about Monty being cautious but on the 10th July Monty summoned Dempsey and Bradley, Caen was now in the bag and Cherbourg and the Conten peninsula all in allied hands. Montgomery wanted to get the breakout plans underway but Bradley was not ready, he still needed to secure the St Lo to Periers road which would be his jump off point for any breakout. Bradley felt that he did not have enough supplies ashore to sustain a breakout and keep it going (oh look somebody else who is cautious, fancy that) So Bradley asked Monty for 10 more days, which Monty was more than happy to go along with as he himself would not go into battle until he was ready. Goodwood was intended to happen the same time as Cobra but Brad was not ready. The Germans were threatening to attack the Americans in numbers and with armour so Goodwood had to go ahead, to give Brad the time and space he needed to get Cobra off the ground.

Goodwood gained very little ground but what it did achieve was to again write down the German forces on 2nd armies front, job done.

General de Guingand

"You must remember that Monty was CinC 21st army group, not commander second British army. Goodwood was phase 1 of twenty first army groups break out. Cobra, Bradley's break out, was phase two. Most of the German tanks were opposing the British. It was imperative to keep them there when Bradley broke out. That was how I saw Goodwood as Monty's chief of staff."

Ian you seem to be on a book spree at the mo I highly recommend this one "The Pendulum of Battle" Operation Goodwood July 44 by Chistopher Dunphie. Give it a try its a great book on how things led to Goodwood, shoots down lots of myths and has some great accounts of the battles involved by men who were there.

Andy

Even today, after all these years, I can never forget those battles,The long hours, the dreadful tiredness, to sleep standing up is easy! And yet we took part in every battle around Caen, as one or two with infantry, or in small groups of us. always out answering calls, or clearing minefields under the Enemies noses at night.

Despite being wounded twice, I often think how damned lucky I was to get back alive. If missing few bits and peices! For a small company we paid a pretty high price.

I look back now, and find it almost inconcievable that I took part in so many deathly assaults and battles and got away with it.....

After 62 years. did I do all those things? Events that sound like a story from some heroic book? The silly thing about all that is: Yes we did do all those things. The thought of it now makes my hair stand on end. All those battles, all those moments of mind boggling fear.

Yes we did do it...But reading about it now, makes it sound like a soldier from a book about some mythical and heroic supermen. Thats how it looks to me now.

Yet in reality, they were the day to day duties of a company in active battle areas, No less, No more and the daily experience of thousands of 19 year old youngsters like myself.

I can hardly believ that I did all those things. Honestly!
Brian

You will always have my thanks for doing so Brian, there cant be many wars or battles that were fought with such verocity as in that bridgehead June/July 1944. I imagine everytime Goodwood is mentioned Troarn enters your mind Brian

andy

This why I am truly lucky and thankful for WBG.com. Growing up while reading WWII books and watching WWII movies with my dad, the men in those books and movies became my heroes, my supermen. To have the ability to speak with the men and women who did it in real life and tell it in their own words is certainly surreal. I am truly honored and humbled to share the same pages of internet space with them. So Brian, your deeds and exploits may seem mythical and superhuman, well that is exactly what they are.

Thanks for that..But It still feels as though it was someone else all those long years ago...But then at 19, I suppose it was "Someone else"
BRian

Agreed.

If only the web had been widely available 10 years earlier - think of what memories we've missed.

I was lucky enough to meet a group of Irish Guards veterans at the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Douai. It was fascinating listening to their stories, laughing at close escapes, casually glossing over actions that won medals (I've got a memory like a sieve, but I'm half-certain that one incident involved ramming a Tiger - which might mean it was John Gorman).

I also witnessed one of the most moving moments I think anybody could come across. It was at the Cathedral during the celebration Service. The Major in charge of the veterans gave a short address and then said it was appropriate to remember their comrades who made the ultimate sacrifice. He started reading from a list, then put it down and, staring straight ahead, spoke out rest of that too long list from memory ... these men are truly Heroes.



I second the motion.

I have often thought about that. Tiger versus Churchill/Sherman in open country together with the dreaded 88's - Not good. It would have been worse had the Tigers reached the beaches on or shortly after D Day. A sleeping Hitler helped there, as well as the Capture of Pegasus/Horsa etc.

Thanks for the book tip - appreciated.


You are all supermen to me Brian. What the allies did on D Day and after was superhuman.


Ditto



If only, I wish we had access to the internet and the veterans 20/30 years ago.

I wonder if we'd have got as much out of people then?

My wife's grandfather was in his eighties when I met her about 12 years ago. He'd served as an Army gunner on merchant ships during the war and told me quite a few stories about his time (including getting sunk a few times). His wife said that she'd never heard some of those stories before. I've heard several comments about veterans not talking about their experiences until they were well into retirement age - in fact, deliberately clamming up about them before that.

You're right there.

I think for many veterans, the 50th and 60th commemorations of D-Day have brought memories of where they were at that time flooding back for many veterans. For some people, like my Grandad, he had buried his experiences as a tankie so deeply that he found it very hard to even read about the war, let alone talk about it. It's perfectly understandable though, because veterans like Brian went through horrors that we can never even begin to imagine, no matter how much we read about the different campaigns they were a part of. I just don't know how they managed to adapt to being back in their normal lives once they returned home. How do you switch off after being part of such battles?

Vicky

I think Fred Glover who posts here is amongst those that have only in recent years started sharing their experiences. Im so glad that so many have done, especially on the BBC's peoples war site, although you have to be careful as some of those stories are rather dodgy.


Andy

The mention of Goodwood, and of Troarn in particular, still gives me a feeling of "ill omen" If that makes any sense at all. Specially Troarn, hope I spelled it right.

Even after 62 years, I still have a feeling of "Unease" A definite feeling of uncomfortable...for the want of a better description. Why? I am not quite sure.... If I was asked what was the worst battle for me? Then the anwer wouold be. there were many times that I thought "the whole bloody worlds gone beserk!"

But after a great deal of thought. I think the Assault crossing of the Escaut Canal at one in the morning. Where we used canvas boats against mortar, shell, heavy machine gun fire, and a heavy calibre Bofors type gun, firing explosive shells that rippled along the concrete top of the Canal. With my best friend laying in a ditch shivering, suffering a bad case of shell shock.

The leaping flames of the house on fire on the opposite bank. The dark red flashes as the fire came in, all on a pitch black night. The swirling smoke and tracers.... The noise, A vision of hell on Earth, not in ones imagination, but here NOW in reality.
The deep frightening blackness of the water...Yet we crossed, and drove on in land, as usual leaving friends behind.

The Photos that dear friend Bart took of that site now, with trees growing along the bank, a scene of a pleasant canal bank, of peace and tranquility, belies what took place there on a dark night in September 1944.

I am sure of this.....although nature has healed the wounds of war. The mental scars on the memories of those that took poart will never heal.
Brian

I read the following post, which lends some support to the hypothesis that 20-30 years ago might have been too early for people to be willing to share their experiences.

I think it's telling that it's taken people 50 to 60 years to be able to speak about their time in combat.

Hmm. I've just finished reading the thread - I think I may have picked a bad example

Aobut Caen, I recommend the book 'The 12th SS', a history of the 12. SS-Panzer Division 'Hitlerjugend', which savaegly fought the British at Caen and was a reason why the British took so long. There are 2 volumnes, and the 1st volumne is an extremly detailed analysis of the fights at Caen. Written by Hubert Meyer, a memebr of the division's staff.

K

Thanks for those recommendations K, and yes indeed explains alot as to why Caen was such a bitter struggle.

Cheers

Interesting that Ambrose on p.50 of Citizen soldiers claims "The difficulty centred round the taking of Caen. Gen Bernard Law Montgomery had said he would take the city on D-day (yawn) but he had not, nor did he do so in the following ten days. Nor was he attacking."


Like alot of Ambrose's claims, where is his evidence that 2nd army were not attacking? Complete nonsense. By the way, really it should be aimed at Dempsey not Montgomery even if that was true. Official history Victory in the West states the British and Canadians were continuously attacking Caen from the morning of D-day until the city was taken, by attacking down the axis of the Caen canal, from the Orne bridgehead on the East and West via Carpiquet, Tilly sur Suelles and Villers bocage. British and Canadian losses to the end of June alone were 1000 men a day on average.

H Jones KSLI from his memoirs, regarding once ashore on d-day and the push for Caen

We reached the southern perimeter of Hermanville, and I turned into an orchard, with my Platoon, on the left-hand side of the road, where we hurriedly dug shallow slit trenches with our entrenching-tools, folding lightweight spades, to prevent casualties from enemy shell-fire. On previous briefings, we had been informed that Sherman tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry would join us in this Assembly Area, and the plan was that we should ride on these tanks and attempt to capture CAEN on D-Day. Unfortunately, the tanks had great difficulty getting off the very congested beaches, and some were knocked out by German 88mm anti-tank guns firing from a ridge about 800 yards to the south of us. This ridge became well known as PERIERS RIDGE. Enemy small arms and machine-gun fire was also coming at us from the direction of the ridge, but we still waited impatiently for the arrival of the Staffords' tanks. After what seemed an eternity, I received orders for my Platoon to move forward on foot without the Staffords. I must admit that the adrenalin was flowing, and I was keen to get in amongst the enemy on the ridge. The time was approximately 1230 hours. As we made our way up the road leading to the ridge, I heard a rustling sound coming from the tall, standing corn on my left, on the other side of a bank. Rather stupidly I stood up on top of the bank, with bullets flying all around, and was a little shocked to see a German soldier advancing towards me with his automatic pistol aimed in my direction. I fired a couple of shots at him with my revolver—they all missed! So much for the intensive weapon training I had undertaken in England!—it still does not cater for nervousness and tension in battle conditions. Fortunately, he threw down his weapon, raised his hands above his head and walked towards me. We lay in a ditch together to escape the bullets passing overhead, and I relieved him of his Record of Service booklet. I then pointed to the town behind me and ordered him to "Marsch Schnell", "Go quickly", and as he left he appeared to be quite happy to be my first prisoner-of-war. We continued our advance up the road when I was sickened to see one of my corporals lying still on the side of the road, shot through the head. He died instantly. He and I had served together for nearly two years and as a young, inexperienced officer I valued him as someone I could lean upon for advice, loyalty and friendship. (I was then 21 years of age). As we got near the top of the ridge, the Germans unexpectedly withdrew. I could see them, about 500 yards away, rapidly flinging themselves into the backs of lorries which had been parked on the other side of the ridge. I grabbed a Bren machine-gun, and liberally sprayed the vehicles as they rapidly drove off southwards. I rushed into a bunker which had just been vacated by the German soldiers, and was relieved to find that it was no longer occupied. The first thing I noticed was the very strong, acrid smell of German tobacco. The time was 1430 hours.

Our next objective was the village of BEUVILLE, and I was ordered to attack the village down the eastern side. This was typical 'bocage' country—thick hedgerows, high banks, and woods in which it was extremely difficult to locate the enemy. As we moved down the forward-facing slope of one of the fields, shots came from our front and two of my soldiers were wounded. Unable to pinpoint the enemy, I decided to return to the main road and attack down the road leading into the village. I called up my Company Commander on the radio to advise him of my whereabouts, and he informed me he was 'holed-up' by snipers, behind a wall just inside the village, and would I please get him out! I zig-zagged down the road with two of my men and they threw smoke grenades to cover the escape of the Major. As we rushed back to the Platoon, a sniper, whom I suspected was in the belfry of the village church, fired one shot and the soldier on my right was hit in the head. Within a second or two, the soldier on my left was also hit. To this day, I still cannot understand why I was not selected by the sniper as a target.

I had just rejoined my Platoon, when a self-propelled vehicle mounting a 105mm artillery gun, drove up alongside me. I rushed over to the commander of the vehicle and told him that there was a sniper in the church belfry holding up our advance, and would he be so kind as to do something about it! In a few seconds a shell smashed into the belfry and the bells suddenly rang out like the sounds of the bells in the 'Hunchback of Notre Dame'! The sniper, I feared, suffered from more than just deafness! I advanced into the village hugging a wall on the right hand side of the road. In front of me was a Major from another Company, and in front of him a private soldier. Suddenly there was an almighty bang and a puff of smoke rose about three yards in front of me. A German soldier had crept down the other side of the wall, out of sight, and lobbed a 'stick' grenade over the wall. The grenade landed between the legs of the soldier in front and he died instantly. The Major was wounded in the arm, so I rushed him across the road into a house where I sat him down on the floor, and called for a stretcher-bearer. I then rejoined my Platoon and as we continued down the road through the village. We were continually sniped at, but fortunately suffered no further casualties.

The village of BIEVILLE a mile or two ahead was our next objective. On the western outskirts of the village my Company Commander was giving orders to myself and the two other Lieutenants for the next phase of the advance on CAEN, now only two miles ahead of us. As we were studying our maps there was one hell of an explosion, and a German shell landed a few feet from us. Fortunately no one was wounded. As I looked toward the enemy I could not believe my eyes. There, advancing round the corner of a wood about five hundred yards away, were five or six German tanks! We hurriedly dispersed and I returned to my Platoon. Later that evening I found it hard to believe that despite all the training we had received in the UK, including a drill to keep well spread out at Company 'Orders Groups', here we were, closely grouped together and presenting an easy target.

I could still hear the sound of German tanks firing and was relieved to hear the sound of our own anti-tank guns and those of the Staffs Yeomanry tanks. Next I heard the sound of enemy tanks rumbling northwards on our right towards the Channel coast. My immediate thought was that this was a major counter-attack by 21st Panzer Division and that we were going to be cut off from the rest of the Battalion. At least four German tanks had been knocked out, and this was to be the only German armoured counter-attack during the whole of D-Day throughout the entire length and breadth of Normandy The time was about 1615 hours.

"Once over the Orne River, I drove North towards the coast. By this time the enemy, consisting of 3rd British and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, had made astonishing progress and had already occupied a strip of high ground about ten kilometres from the sea. From here the excellent anti-tank fire of the Allies knocked out eleven of my tanks before I had barely started." (General Feuchtinger, Commander 21st Panzer Division).

Little did I know that Field Marshal Rommel had said, on hearing of the invasion, "My God, if the 21st Panzer Division can make it, we might just be able to drive them (the invasion forces) back.”

Staffordshire Yeomanry, from Lieut-Commander P.K. Kemp from the book The Staffordshire Yeomanry (Q.O.R.R.) in the First and Second World Wars



Shortly after reaching the ridge, "G" Squadron was ordered to support the K.S.L.I. in clearing the villages of Bieville and Beuville, necessitating an advance over the top of the ridge and across open ground in the face of heavy, close-range fire from a battery of enemy 122-mm. field guns, firing east from the wooded area around Periers-sur-le-Dan. They reached Beuville without loss and, after a certain amount of confused fighting, cleared both villages. Nos. 1 and 2 Troops of this squadron were then ordered to find a crossing over a natural anti-tank obstacle south-west of Bieville and, after negotiating that successfully, worked forward into Lebisey Wood.

In the meantime the Commanding Officer had ordered "B" Squadron to occupy the ridge just vacated by "C" Squadron, while "A" Squadron, under the command of Major M. A. Spencer-Nairn, was assisting the Norfolk and Warwickshire Regiments in clearing up an enemy strongpoint by-passed by the leading armour and still holding out.

The squadrons were now widely separated, with "G" approaching Lebisey Wood, "B" on the high ground above Perier-surs-le-Dan about a mile away, and "A" Squadron temporarily detached from the Regiment's command. When the Reconnaissance Troop reported enemy tanks advancing from the direction of Caen, the Commanding Officer asked for the immediate release of "A" Squadron, which came forward just in time to take up battle positions to the west of Bieville. The enemy tanks were advancing fast and were engaged as soon as they reached the western end of the anti-tank obstacle. Two of them were knocked out and the remainder moved west into the wooded country in the direction of Le Mandel. Two troops of "A" Squadron, well placed on the right flank of the Regiment, caught these tanks as they emerged at a range of about 600 yards, and Sergeant Joyce's gunner destroyed three of them before they could retreat into cover. Another group, swinging farther to the west, moved fast for the high ground above Periers-sur-le-Dan, where "B" Squadron's Shermans accounted for three of them before driving the remainder off.

While all this was happening, "C" Squadron in the Lebisey area was being shelled fairly heavily. Lieutenant Winterhalder was killed when his tank was hit in an engagement with two enemy tanks near the crossing of the anti-tank obstacle. The infantry, too, had suffered serious casualties during their heavy fighting and, since the Norfolk and Warwickshire Regiments were not available to assist in clearing Lebisey Wood, being still engaged in mopping up the strong-point farther back, it was decided to withdraw from that area and consolidate behind the anti-tank obstacle.

Excellent stuff, Andy! Having walked up the ridge from Collville I can appreciate just how difficult an opposed advance would be. The gradient is very steep and any attacker is limited in his choice of approach.

Steve