CAEN June 1944

Well its often said that the British were too slow on D-Day and could have done more to have taken Caen. Too many people get hooked up on what Montgomery said, and don’t study exactly what happened. You always hear, “Well Monty said he would be in Caen on D-day, Monty said this and he said that. Don’t worry about what was said look at what actually happened and most of all don’t believe the hype. Also it would be a good idea to read both sides of the story, don’t just read Ambrose’s D-day and then accuse people and Divisions of this and that.

I will try to put a bit of perspective on why British 3rd Division did not reach Caen and there are many reasons for this, and most of which has been ignored by Chester Wilmot and David Belchem in their own books, this is not to say that I think their books are flawed (who am I to judge) just that certain things don’t add up and a bit more researching could have thrown more light on the matter. I will add more as I go. Also just to add that if you read any personal accounts from the men of 3rd Div you will know that they could not have done anymore and the accusation of being sluggish is rather ridiculous.

A run down of what British 3rd division was composed of on D-day, these are main regiments, there many other units involved. Of course we all know about 246 Field company RE

8th Brigade
1st Battalion The Suffolk Regiment
2nd Battalion The East Yorkshire Regiment
1st Battalion The South Lancashire Regiment

9th Brigade
2nd Battalion The Lincolnshire Regiment
1st Battalion The King's Own Scottish Borders
2nd Battalion The Royal Ulster Rifles

185th Brigade
2nd Battalion The Royal Warwickshire Regiment
1st Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment
2nd Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment

3rd Reconnaissance Regiment R.A.C
3rd Divisional Engineers
2nd Battalion The Middlesex Regiment (Machine Gun)

27TH (INDEPENDENT) ARMOURED BRIGADE
13/18th Royal Hussars
1st East Riding Yeomanry
The Staffordshire Yeomanry

For June 1944 3rd Div suffered 3508

A lot has been written down the years and this Appendix by Norman Scarfe says it all for me which is taken from his recently reprinted book.



Norman Scarfe Assualt Division- The divs official historian
APPEDIX C page 274

This is aimed at critics of the divs performance in the battle for Caen.

"Justice and truth seem not to have been near the forefront of David Belchem's mind in 1980 when his book "victory in Normandy" appeared. While the late Eric Lummis was at work on an account of the 1st Suffolk's undaunted D-day assualt on Hillman, I was able to show him the correspondance I had had with Carlo D'Este when he was writing " Decision in Normandy, the first serious description of the whole Normandy campaign which revealed a true understanding of the 3rd div's actions on that day. We agreed that none of the neighbouring assualt divisions was confronted by a headquarters bunker so formidably strong and well sited as Hillman, which the Suffolks had overcome by the end of that day. Nor did the other assualt divs meet a panzer attack as threatening as 21st Panzer divs, which Bill Eadies Staffirdshire yeomanry and the other 3 div support units so decisively drove off. Then, when we examined the speed of advance on the 3rd Canadian div and 50 div fronts, we found their performance closely comparable with ours.

So Lord Lovat's sneer at 8 brigades achievement in his complacent account of his own ( with its revealing title, March past 1978,p311) was ill informed and ill judged. The official verdict ( Victory in the west1962 p213) was properly appreciative of the two British and one Canadian seabourne assaults on that stormy sea shore, to have swept away all but a few isolated fragments of Hitler’s Atlantic wall and to have fought their way an average depth of four to six miles on most of a twenty four miles front was surely a notable feat of arms.

Michael Howard has persuasively suggested that 3 div's D-day plan to capture Caen, nine miles inland and with vital river crossings, was in the nature of things
"aspirational". This was demonstrated about an hour after midday when 9 brigade, our reserve brigade, lost its commander, intelligence officer and other staff, soon after coming ashore, all seriously injured, and one killed, by one mortar bomb. At once, the corps commander, Lt Gen Crocker, changed 9 brigades plan, and with it the whole divisions. Instead of heading boldly for Carpiquet airfield alongside 3 Can div, 9 brigade was switched to shield our left flank along the Orne and Caen canal. That was the end of any hope of taking Caen on D-day. It had nothing to do with slow advances that afternoon alleged by Wilmot, Belchem, et al.

Clearly, the corps commander was not determined to take Caen at all costs on D-day, and was anxious about the active presence of 21st panzer div. As the days passed, there was a curious silence in the national press about the presence of 3 div in Normandy. Divisions that had led the assault were not pleased to see those that had made their name in North Africa and put up understandably stale performances in Normandy continuing to get "star" treatment in the newspapers. Our own men naturally felt indignant and wondered what their families would be thinking. Ill informed journalists followed Wilmot’s lead and hinted at our infantry’s slowness on D-day, and at their brigadiers and their commanders lack of driving power, for not being in Caen that night. If this book has done nothing else, it will I hope have nailed that journalism as unpardonable calumny."



The next bit is to highlight more on what was going on back on the beaches and to show its not just a matter of rolling into a city like Caen.


Source: L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Volume I: The Battle of Normandy (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962), pages 183 to 213.

"It is impossible to say when the first beach exits were open. People were too busy to keep looking at their watches and some exits, opened fairly quickly, were later blocked by knocked-out vehicles or traffic jams. It had been foreseen that the rate of landing would be governed by the availability of exits and it had been planned to open twenty-eight in the first hour [on the British and Canada beaches]. The 3rd Division and the 50th [on Gold beach] appear to have had their first exits opened not much later but not nearly all that were needed; two hours or more elapsed before the first was opened on the Canadian beaches. The delay in each case had slowed the landings of the reserve brigades and this inevitability had far-reaching effects on the day's progress...."


The 185th Brigade Group had landed nearly up to time and the infantry were assembled in woods half a mile inland by about eleven o'clock. The brigade was to be the spearhead of the division's attack inland; it was to advance with all speed and if possible capture Caen and the ground immediately south of it that day. The advance was to be led by a mobile column of the 2nd King's Shropshire Light Infantry, riding on tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry and supported by the 7th Field Regiment, R.A.; but at noon the infantry's heavy weapons and vehicles were still not clear of the congestion on the shore and the tanks that had succeeded in getting through were being held up by a minefield."


Now Mat (Bobfish) I hope you dont mind me pinching this from one of your posts

This is from the I Corps Operation Order No.1 this dates from April/May 1944

"20. 3 British Division

a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.

b ) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--

i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above

In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he suceeds in forestalling us there.

c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.

i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.

Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."



Despite some claims, 3rd div had a pretty rough landing, 29 out of 38 assault landing craft were lost. The landing was more strongly opposed than they had expected. Underwater and shore obstacles were more numerous than the 1943 photos taken of the beach defenses. These factors caused considerable congestion on the beaches which derailed the carefully planned time table for the landings. This had a knock on effect and slowed the thrust inland.

Although by 11am 3 infantry batt's were ashore and ready to move inland (KSLI, Norfolk’s, Warwicks) the armour on which the KSLI were to hitch a ride and have as cover were still back on the beach. Which by mid morning was chaotic at times. One of the reasons being was that as the tide came in, it was estimated that 30 yards of sand would be left exposed to continue landing vehicles and supplies, but as the tide came in it was only 10 yards of sand, and very soft sand at that.

The only way the LC could beach and unload their cargos were to land exactly opposite the beach exits. This was not easy as the beach was by now full of debris, burnt out DD tanks, hit LC's, RE armoured vehicles and so on. To make things even worse the German coastal batteries were now ranging in on the beaches, which was made easier as they used the AA barrage ballons anchored off shore to do this.

So the KSLI were awaiting the Staff's Yeomanry but they were stuck nose to tail getting off the beach. It got so bad at one point that landing was halted for half an hour to clear the exits. It was the KSLI that were to lead the assault on Caen and the Norfolk’s and Warwick’s (although some Warwick’s went to reinforce the airborne bridgehead) moping up the gains as they captured them.

On the way 185 brigade encountered the 2nd battalion of the 192 PZ grens on Periers ridge who were supported by SP guns.

Also on the rear slope there were 6 Russian 12.2cm howitzers firing for all they were worth, these should have been knocked out on H hour by fighter bombers or by the heavies.

Beuville and Bieville were reached with the latter around 4pm. Y company KSLI and a troop of Staffs yeo were immediately sent on to Lebisey wood, recce units soon saw 24 (more like around 40) German tanks advancing fast from the direction of Caen. The order was given to dig in and defensive posisitions were taken up.

D+1 and the 3rd div formed a kind of wedge shape pointing towards Caen which lay around 3 miles away. Another set of problems now faced 3rd div, there was a 2 mile wide gap between them and the Canadian 3rd div. This gap was used the evening before by the 21st PZ divs attack (the only one which the allies faced on D-day) between this gap were some German strongpoints still holding out. Also on the Eastern flank 6th airborne were being frequently attacked and being a lightly armed div this caused great concern for Crocker.

Crocker either put the bulk of 3rd div into an all out assualt on Caen, or he could pause and consolidate, as he did not have the strength to do both. He decided to consolidate and closed the gap between both Brit and Canadian 3rd divs and so linking all the British beachheads.



More detail of the landing and follow through, which I think highlights the problems faced by the Assault troops and those trying to get off the beaches.

Norman Scarfe Assault Division page 78 +

Three large landing-craft of 185, the Intermediate Brigade were hit before disembarkation, and there were casualties between the beach and the Brigade Assembly Area north of Hermanville. The laden men struggled ashore in four feet of water, clinging to ropes run out to the beach by the Navy But by 11 o’clock the three infantry battalions were assembled inland and ready, and Brigade H.Q. was established in Hermanville. The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry were in the middle, with the Royal Norfolks on the left and the Royal Warwicks on the right. The K.S.L.I. were to mount the tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry, from 27 Armoured Brigade, and advance along the main axis to secure Caen as quickly as possible. The Norfolks on the left and Warwicks on the right were to mop up and secure objectives captured by the mobile column. But there was no sign of the Staffordshire Yeomanry, who were caught on the beach, which, so far from being cleared, was becoming more tightly congested as the tide came in. And in the Assembly Area the two most westerly companies of the Warwicks came under accurate machine-gun fire from German positions towards Lion and Cresserons. Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. S. Herdon, their Commander, prepared a plan for attacking these positions, subject to the approval of the Brigade Commander, Brigadier K.P. Smith, O.B.E.
The Brigadier was in an unhappy dilemma: whether to launch the assault on foot or wait for the tanks. The General's order was that "this advance will be carried out with speed and boldness so that the enemy's local reserves can be overcome quickly and the Brigade established on its objective ready to meet counterattacks by reserve formations which may develop towards evening on D-day." The question was whether more speed might not be attained by waiting for the tanks than by committing the troops to an attack on foot. Available intelligence was that on the left the East Yorks were still moving across the open marshy ground under observation and mortar-fire, in their advance on the enemy position Sole behind Riva Bella, that the Suffolks had cleared Colleville without much trouble, as the Commandos had just done some of the work on their way through to the bridges. But the Suffolks had still to attack Morris and Hillman, which stood right in the way of the Norfolk advance.
At midday Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Maurice, commanding the K.S.L.I., reported to Brigadier Smith that only about one and a half squadrons of the Stafford Yeomanry were clear of the beaches, and that a large minefield apparently covered the right flank of Hermanville across the axis of advance originally planned for the tanks. They could not leave the road on account of the bog and were consequently nose to tail and all stationary whenever there was a hold-up ahead. Brigadier Smith therefore ordered the K.S.L.L to advance on foot along the main axis, Hermanville-Beuville-Caen, immediately, the Stafford Yeomanry to "marry-up" as soon as possible. The Norfolks were to wait in Colleville, to pass through the Suffolks as soon as Morris and Hillman were clear.
Lieutenant-Colonel N. P. H. Tapp, R.A., was at this "Order Group." He had been watching his regiment, the 7th Field Regiment, as, shortly after beaching, they roared past Hermanville cross-roads to deploy just to the south in the open fields, and just in front of the South Lancs, the southernmost infantry in the area. The infantry, feeling the strain and reaction from their first attacks on the beach positions, were surprised, relieved, and greatly cheered at this spectacle. In the Colonel's words: "I do not know if the Gunners knew they were the foremost troops at that time. They were probably better disposed to enjoy the honour in retrospect! I grew more and more cheerful as I counted the guns and vehicles going past, *15* and by 12 o'clock was able to say to the Brigadier: 'The 7th Field Regiment is in action with all its assault vehicles and ready to support its affiliated tanks and infantry.'"
At 12.15 Brigadier Smith received intelligence of enemy tanks in front of Caen, of heavy enemy fire from Periers-sur-le-Dan, and of stiff enemy opposition to the Canadians on the right flank. He ordered the Warwicks to disengage the enemy in their original Assembly Area and occupy the area left by the Norfolks. The K.S.L.I. moved off up the Periers ridge. In them, they knew, was centred the whole hope of the Division: theirs was the central thrust of the assault, and aimed at Caen. They soon dealt with the machine-guns and mortars that opposed them on either side of the cross-roads just forward of the crest. But before we can follow them further we had better be clear about the beach situation and the extent of the beach-head secured by 8 Brigade.

The clearing of the beach-exits proved to be about the hardest and most heart-breaking job of the invasion. No sooner had one crisis been overcome than another arose. The tide came up quickly, and the beach was eventually reduced to a width of 10 yards instead of the 30 yards anticipated. This meant that vehicles had to land immediately facing one of the exits if they were to get off the beach; there was not much scope for lateral movement. The exits were no longer marked, however, by the coloured windsocks that the Navy knew and made for. During one period of heavy enemy shelling, from inland and from the coastal batteries along the left flank, it was obvious that the Germans were ranging both on the windsocks and on the sixty barrage balloons brought over for beach anti-aircraft defence, some of which had already been cut adrift. The Divisional Commander ordered the immediate loosing of the remainder.

The problems were innumerable, but a main one was the soft strip of sand at the top of the beach over which bridging vehicles and many others had to be towed by Beach Section recovery teams; this amongst all the welter of transport edging towards the exits, stranded landing-craft, derelict D-D tanks and Armoured Vehicles, R.E., and, not least, over fifty self-propelled guns (including the eight of the 5th R.M. Battery) all firing from the water's edge, and having to advance up the beach at one point when they looked like getting out of their depth Finally, blockages were frequently caused beyond the exits by tracked vehicles losing their tracks on mines between the exits and first lateral, and later on, when there was a hold-up on the road across the marsh, a continuous column extended nose to tail right back into the exits and was itself the cause of obstruction to tanks not yet clear of the beach.

If more were needed to aggravate a critical situation, the Commander of 5 Assault Regiment, R.E., had been killed at H-hour; and the Commander of 5 Beach Group was killed some hours later, as he was carrying out a reconnaissance of the westerly beaches. Major Carse, who had commanded the Battle School in quiet Moffat, took over command of 5 Beach Group. For the first four and a half hours of the assault craft had been beaching to time, and the majority had been able to discharge immediately. Then it was decided to hold up all beaching for half an hour to clear the beach. This action was justified. When beaching was resumed, the tide was ebbing and the exits were clear.

8 Brigade were still attacking strongly defended positions. The East Yorks found resistance at Sole much fiercer than had been anticipated. Incidentally, they were not the first to reach it. The chronicler of the 2nd Middlesex, relating the action of their A (machine-gun) Company, writes: "No. 4 Platoon, under Lieutenant Milne, were reorganised and went off via Colleville to strong-point Sole, expecting to find the East Yorks Battalion H.Q. Instead, the leading carrier came under fire from a light anti-tank gun." However, the East Yorks had cleared Sole by 1 o'clock and the F.O.O. with G Company, Captain Featherstone, established his party in an O.P. on the enemy position. They were "slightly embarrassed by the appearance of eighty Germans surrendering from a dug-out. A wide burst of Sten-gun fire at the leading German, before it was clear what their intentions were, hastened the process. A section of the East Yorks were asked to take the Germans in charge." The East Yorks now made preparations for the attack on the gun position at Daimler.
Their Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. Hutchinson, was caught by enemy mortar fire in a sunken lane, wounded, and had to be evacuated.


The Divisional Commander came to see what progress had been made. *16* "I explained the situation," wrote Colonel Goodwill, "and he said we must capture the strong-point before dark, so that we should be dug-in on our consolidation positions before the enemy armour, that was reported to be in the neighbourhood, could attack at first light." 185 Brigade had encountered the 2nd Battalion of 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by self-propelled guns on the Periers ridge. Already the Division was face to face with the 21st Panzer Division, thought to have been from 10 to 30 miles south of Caen. *17*

*15* Explaining how "with one or two very helpful Military Policemen and an increasingly hoarse voice" the congestion difficulties had been overcome, the Second-in-Command of the Regiment said: "There was a natural and very correct reluctance to leave the track because of the danger of mines. But from my previous observations, I was able to direct the guns in Infantry tracks through the corn. Although this caused words with a Sapper officer, none of the guns was blown up and they got through much more quickly."
*16* General Rennie was ashore by 10.30 a.m; unlike the situation at Suvla with Mahon, Stopford and Hammersley, the difficulty lay in restraining him from risking the dangers of the front-line. Later in the morning the Corps Commander was seen walking in Hermanville. Neither wore a steel helmet. At 5 o'clock that afternoon General Rennie was able to inform Brigadier Smith that he supposed St. Aubin to be clear since he had just driven through it in his jeep!
*17* This battalion had moved into Buron three weeks before the assault, and merely in accordance with Rommel's general policy, came right forward to the Periers ridge on the evening of 5 June. Lieutenant-General Edgar Feuchtinger, the Commander of 21 Panzer Div, came directly under Von Rundstedt's command. Though Rundstedt passed the buck to the defunct Fuhrer in his interview with Major Shulman in October, 1945, it remains true that Feuchtinger got not a word from him till 7 a.m. on D-day, and no operational order till 10 a.m.: Rundstedt needed no higher authority to commit 21 Panzer Div. It was the one Division in immediate reserve capable of affecting the battle, having about 170 armoured fighting vehicles. At 10 a.m. Feuchtinger had decided to wait no longer, and attack the airborne troops immediately, but at 10 a.m. "I was ordered to stop the move of my tanks against the Allied Airborne troops, and to turn west and aid the forces protecting Caen —i.e. against the 3rd Division.


More to follow

Omar Bradley

"The containment mission that had been assigned Monty was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishment of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up the German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. By the end of June, Rommel had concentrated seven Panzer divisions against Monty' s British sector. One was all the enemy could spare for the US front"


Montgomery's downfall after the war was to claim that every detail went to plan, it obviosuly did not, but with out a doubt the "overall" plan for Normandy did not change. Monty obviously planned, hoped and perhaps expected more ground to have been gained on D-day and D+1. But as Prussian Field Marshall Von Moltke said, "No plan survives intact the first encounter with the enemy". Wavell said "War is a muddle, it is bound to be. There are so many incalculable accidents in the uncertain business. A turn in the weather which could not be forseen, a message gone astray, a leader struck down at a critical moment. It is very rarely that even the best laid plans go smoothly. The lesson is to realise this, and to provide as far as possible, against the uncertainties of war, and not be surprised when they happen."

Montgomery's overall plan did not change, no, Caen did not fall on D-day or D+1, but his overall plan to keep the bulk of the German forces in the Caen area and to breakout in the Western sector did not.

Another author, Christopher Dunphie who served in the British army this is taken from his book The pendulum of battle Operation Goodwood

Following the D-day landings the first allied priority was to link up the five landing beaches to form a continuous beachhead. In the East this was quickly achieved. Gold and Juno beaches were linked by the end of D-day. Responsible for both Juno and Sword, but with a 3 mile gap between them, I Corps Commander, Lt Gen John Crocker, faced something of a dilema. His main D-day objective had been Caen, which had not been taken, hardly surprising since 3rd Div, with relatively few tanks, was quickly confronted by the tanks of 21st PZ Div. On D+1 Crocker could either drive hard for Caen or concentrate on linking up Sword and Juno. He could not do both simultaneously. Critics of the failure to capture Caen quickly might have had stronegr grounds for complaint if he had forged ahead, broken into the outskirts of Caen but handed to 21st PD the freedom to expand the wedge between Sword and Juno.

By the end of the 7th June therefore, with the Americans from Omaha having met British from Gold in the area of Port En Bessin, there was a continuous beachhead nearly forty miles long.

Andy

Andy,
I am totally,T....OT....A.....LLY enjoying your posts and the interchanges between yourself and a couple of other very well informed souls. Long may you all reign. Well formed opinions and statements and D*** good research.

Andy I commend you for putting this together. I do feel, however, you will be hitting your head against the proverbial brick wall. The following is from a web site entitled 'The Unknown Patton' (www.pattonhq.com)

On June 6th, 1944, the Allied Forces launched "Overlord". The invasion of Normandy. This force, consisting of the First Army (American) and the Second Army (British) was commanded by General Montgomery.

On August 1st, 1944, D-Day+55, Patton's Third Army became officially operational.

Between July 5th, when Third Army had actually landed on French soil, and July 31, Third Army had advanced inland to the town of Avranches. The advance was a total of about 50 miles in 26 days.

In a comparison, Montgomery and his Second British Army had, since D-Day, advanced to the town of Caen, about 10 miles inland. A total of ten miles in 55 days. Montgomery's explanation for his slowness was that he was "re-grouping" in order to pivot at Caen and attack the Germans in force. This "pivoting on Caen" became a joke to the Americans. The French pronunciation of the word is "can".

By August 11, D-Day+66, Patton and his Third Army had broken completely out of the Cherbourg peninsula. He had advanced south, west, east, and north. Third Army had ripped a hole through the German Seventh Army and had roared "hell for leather" through the towns of Avranches, Mortain, Fougeres, Vitre, Mayenne, and Laval. They had made a sharp 90 degree turn at Le Mans and attacked north to the town of Alecon. They had gone a total of 200 miles in 10 days.

Montgomery had finally "pivoted on Caen" and had advanced another 10 miles. A total of 20 miles in 66 days.

By August 15th, D-Day+70, Third Army units (the Second French Armored Division and the 90th American Infantry Division) had reached Argentan, a town about 12 miles from Falaise. Canadian troops under Montgomery had reached the outskirts of Falaise. August 17th, D-Day+72, saw Patton's 90th Division and Second French Division joined by the 80th Infantry Division at Argentan. Montgomery's Second Army was still about 10 miles from Falaise.

At this point, there was a gap of 12 miles between Falaise to Argentan through which the German Seventh Army was escaping. Patton and his Third Army had moved 250 miles in 17 days. They had completely encircled the German Seventh Army, and were now ready to advance directly to Falaise. Blocking their escape and destroying them would be like shooting fish in a barrel.

Montgomery had moved about 20 miles in 72 days.

http://www.pattonhq.com/unknown/chap06.html



That passage is not a criticism of Montgomery, it is an attack on the bravery of British 2nd Army, including the Canadians and Poles who fought alongside our American allies in Normandy. There is no mention at all of the imbalance of German Panzer Divisions facing the British & American armies.

Steve

Okay, I'll try and add some stuff I copied from the other day at the PRO and various books.

Lebisey Woods
D+1 - 185th Infantry Brigade

185th Brigade was the unit initially tasked with capturing Caen - an ambitious objective for a single brigade, one might think, but on June 7th that objective still remained to be fulfilled.

Midnight on June 6th found the brigade dispersed north of Caen, the 2nd Kings Shropshire Light Infantry dug in in the town of Bieville, north of Lebisey. The 2nd Warwicks were on the north-eastern outskirts of Blainville, alongside the Caen Canal, with one company defending the canal bridge (Pegasus bridge). And the 1 Norfolks were dug-in on the high ground to the east of Beuville.

At 0730 on June 7th, the Brigade commander, Brigadier Smith, issued orders to his brigade. The 2 Warwicks were to attack Lebisey at 0945hrs, supported by three field regiments and one Cruiser. The battalion moved off to their assembly positions - along the way A Company, the left forward company, came under fire from houses on the outskirts of Beauregard. The delay this caused made the Battalion CO, Lt Col Herdon ask for a change of H-Hour, which was agreed - though only an extra half-hour was granted.

However there was some breakdown in comms, B Company, the right forward company, and C Company, the reserve, made it to their forming up point in good time and attacked at the original H-Hour. However, the change in H-Hour meant that they attacked without artillery support. And there was no tank support available, in part because of the natural anti-tank obstacle.

Lebisey is an imposing position, situated on the northern part of Hill 61, the high ground overlooking Caen and controlling the routes leading into the city from the north. Firstly there is the wood that is sat atop the high ground, overlooking the ground that the British held. To the left of the wood is the small village of Lebisey, that 21st Panzer soon turned into a fortress - though this wouldn't have been the case this early in the campaign. From the hilltop, the ground slopes down to what is referred to in some accounts as "the natural anti-tank ditch". This is a dry river-course, that prevented easy access for armour - limiting it to the roads. The ditch, however, is also dead ground, allowing a good forming up point for infantry. Ensconced in the village, and the wood, were men of the 1st Battalion, 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 21st Panzer Division - supported by tanks of the 22nd Panzer Regiment.

B and C Company's advanced up the hill, and made it to within 200m of the wood at which point they were fired upon. Moving forward, they reported that they were in the wood but that the advance was slowing due to the resistance. It was at this point that Lt-Colonel Herdon ordered A Company, in Beauregard, to join the attack. A Company advanced up the hill, got into the forward edge of the wood, and came under "intense fire" when they entered it.

"We eventually got into the wood where control became very difficult. I was hit by a phosphorous grenade and a burst of MG fire from a hidden position in front of the me.....The Company held on to the edges of the wood until the rest of the battalion came up.....but they were unable to move further forward."
Lt Adams. A Company.

Colonel Herdon moved forward to try and sort the situation out, but in doing so he was hit and killed. By this point tanks had appeared and casualties were steadily rising. Brigade received a message to say that A Company were out of contact, B Company were in the centre of the wood under attack, and that C Company were following up. This was followed by another message saying that the Warwicks were on their objective.

Whether this signal was true or not, I don't know (yet). But it led to another of the day's traumas; the battalion Anti-Tank platoon, commanded by a Captain Bannerman, were ordered up into Lebisey village - believing that the battalion were on their objective. Moving forward up the Bieville - Caen road they motored all the way into Lebisey village before they discovered otherwise. The entire column was knocked out by some tanks, 88's and MG's. By now D Company had been released from their guard duty at Pegasus bridge at about Noon, and they were sent into the fight. They advanced on the north-eastern corner of the wood but were counter-attacked by tanks and soon found themselves in much the same situation as the rest of the battalion.

With word that the Warwicks were in the wood, Brigadier Smith ordered the 1 Norfolks to attack through the Warwicks and take the high ground (Hill 61) beyond. He also heard that the Warwicks' situation was critical, and hoped to use the Norfolks attack to cover the withdrawal of the Warwicks and to consolidate in the wood, before renewing the assault at the nearest available time.

The Norfolks formed up in Bieville, and reached their start line in the natural anti-tank ditch, coming under shellfire as they did so. H-Hour was set for 1830hrs, with the objective the "eastern edge" of the wood.

(I can't help but think that's a typing error in the Brigade diary? Surely it should be "western" edge - because to advance on the east from their FUP would involve cutting across the front of the wood, and also mixing it up with the Warwicks? Hmmm. Oh wait, Tim Kilvert-Jones' book says their objective was the East part of the Caen road, which would make more sense)

The Norfolk's advanced under covering fire - which in itself was limited as the exact position of the Warwicks was unknown. The battalion came under heavy fire from mortars, MG's and snipers as they battled into the wood. The close country made it difficult to establish the source of the fire, both to suppress it or call in artillery. Another company encountered a minefield and got stuck in it. Casualties increased, and the attack bogged down.

At 2200hrs, the Warwicks began their planned withdrawal. The CO of the Norfolks also opted to withdraw, having suffered heavily and with all indications that to stay would mean disaster. In light of the opposition faced, with no signs that the enemy were planning to withdraw, this was the right thing to do

The Warwick's suffered 154 casualties in the day's fighting. I'm afraid to say I don't have exact figures for the Norfolk's, but I believe they suffered around 100 casualties. Also, bear in mind that this was the first attack of the campaign by either Battalion, made without a preparatory bombardment or without tank support, up imposing ground and into a heavily forested area.

By the end of D+1, 21st Panzer had effectviely blunted 185th Brigade's attack on Caen. The attack's on 185 Brigade's flanks had also bogged down, and the Canadians on the right on 3rd Division, had experienced a full-blown counter-attack by the newly arrived 12th SS Panzer. Although the positions of both Division's were secure, all attempts at offensive operations had been rebuffed.

Sources:
Monty's Ironsides: Patrick Delaforce
Sword Beach: Tim Kilvert-Jones
185 Inf Bde War Diary, PRO WO171/702

I'll post some pictures when Imageshack stops messing me about.




Holy Crap! I almost had a hysterical fit reading that! My heart's not meant to be put under that much strain.

Apart from the fact it's grossly insulting, it's also appallingly selective with the truth. Fails to mention that Patton wouldn't have managed to break out at all had it not been for all the work Bradley and Dempsey did in writing down the German armour and manouvering into position.

I'm sure some people will agree with every word of it though. But hey, if people want to believe such biased junk, then they obviously care little for both veteran's and the truth.

Thank you Jaycee, thats much appreciated mate

Steve and Mat the site I chuckle over most is Patton uncovered, here is something from its home page, the line about France really tickles me especially as Pattons drive across France hardly saw any Germans. Take a look at his thread on Monty, he reckons Montys soldiers were almost at the point of mutiny pmsl

QUOTE

In WWI Montgomery’s men were brought to the verge of mutiny because of his arrogant behavior

.

Yea right

QUOTE

George Patton's army liberated France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Bavaria, Austria and Czechoslavakia. It was George S. Patton’s Third Army which traveled faster than the German blitzkrieg, captured or killed 1,000 Germans every day in combat, trapped 11 German divisions at Falaise, rescued the stranded Allies in Bastogne, finished off the Battle of the Bulge, surrounded and cut off 10 German divisions in the Hunsruck Mountains, crossed the Rhine with only 28 casualties, liberated the first concentration camp, and discovered the German gold reserve

BASIC CONCEPTION OF THE ARMY PLAN FOR NORMANDY

The intention for operation Overlord was to assault, simultaneously, beaches on the Normandy coast immediately North of the Carentan estuary and between the Carentan estuary and the river Orne, with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area which was to include airfield sites, the port of Cherbourg and the ports of Brittany.

To achieve this task I decided upon the plan of the land battle and subsequently explained it myself to the General Officers of filed armies in London on 7th April 1944.

Once ashore and firmly established, my plan was to threaten to break out of the initial bridgehead on the Eastern flank, that is, in the Caen sector. I intended by means of this threat to draw the main enemy reserves into that sector, to fight them there and keep them there using the British and Canadian armies for the purpose. Having got the main enemy reserves committed on the Eastern flank, my plan was to make the break out on the Western flank, using for this task the American armies under General Bradley, and to pivot the whole front on Caen. The American break-out thrust was to be delivered Southwards down to the Loire and then to be developed Eastwards in a wide sweep up to the Seine about Paris. This movement was designed to cutt off all the enemy forces South of the Seine, over which river the bridges were to be destroyed by air action.

This strategy was evolved from consideration primarily of the layout of enemy reserve formations in Western Europe, the run of rail and road communications leading to Normandy and the immediate task of the operation, which was to secure ports. The capture of the Contentin and Brittany peninsulas and the rapid opening of the ports located in them meant that we required to make rapid territorial gains in the West. On the Eastern flank, acquisition of ground was not so pressing providing the air force requirements for airfield construction could be met (this is why Montgomery fell fowl of Mallory and Tedder, but as it was later proved the airforces did a magnificent job even without having a mass of airfields in the Normandy bridgehead, my italics) This pointed to the need for breaking out on the American front. If in turn the expansion in the West were to proceed rapidly, we had to draw the enemy weight away from that flank and in this we were greatly assisted by the immence strtegic importance of Caen.

The city of Caen was a vital road and rail communication center through which the main routes from the East and South East passed. Since the bulk of the enemy mobile reserves was from the East and might be expected to converge on Caen. Hence if a major threat to the enemy containing forces could be developed and sustained in the Caen sector, his reserves would tend to become initially commited there.

It was to be expected that the enemy would react strongly to an advance on Caen, such a course would indicate to him out intention to break through the Caen bottleneck in order to exploit out armoured resources in the more open country to the South East. This direction would moreover give us the shortest approach to the Seine ports and Paris.

The arguments convinced me that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our object of drawing the enemy mobile reserves on to our eastern flank.

This was my original conception of the manner in which the battle of Normandy was to be developed. From the start it formed the basis of all out planning, and was the aim of our operations from the time of the assault to the final victory in Normandy. I never once had cause or reason to alter my plan. In order to understand the battle of Normandy, it is essential that this fact should be clearly appreciated.

Field Marshall Montgomery Normandy to the Baltic page 16 and written in 1947

Just goes to show how you can twist history to suit your own ends. Does that site (more of a shrine then a historical reference) mention the slapping incident. What about the Hammelburg fiasco, id be interested to see how they interpret that.
What evidence was used to back up that mutiny statement...any???
Kind of amazing that modern 'historians' can still take such a blinkered view. Especially when the internet has brought so much information into peoples homes.
Anyway can this be described as off-topic?
I agree with Jaycee, great thread

I feel your pain with regard to imageshack matt I gave up trying to upload some of my cenotaph pics

somewhat of a difinitve thread , well done mate. Including some important and commendable resource references. Garners of ww2 infoshould read this from p1 onwards and not allow themselves to assume so much about Normandy d-day to Falaise.

More to come, but im sure we will have a couple of visitors before long quoting Liddell Hart and D'Este

Andy

Though Montgomery was not ashore on D-day to recieve detailed accounts he could feel satified with the broad picture of the days results. Along a reach of 24 miles the British and Canadians had penetrated to a depth of four to six miles. Omaha had proved only a partial disater. Utah showed some promise. The airborne flanks were solidifying. German reactions had been slow and inconclusive. The allies held the air. And according to plan, the German tanks were being drawn by the magnet of Caen

Still more was the case on D+1. Events on the Eastern flank during this day must be considered against the background knowledge that fortitude, the great deception scheme to convince the Germans that the Normandy landings werea feint, still held swy in the minds of the higher command from Hitler downwards. 7 army must operate with its own resources. The five infantry and two Panzer divisions which could have been moved from 15 army stayed motionless. And even 7 army's strategic reserve of tanks was not immediately available. 12th SS and Panzer Lehr had been drawn to the battle, but 17 SS was 200 miles away , below the Loire. 1 SS was in Belgium and 2SS was miles away in Toulouse. Thus the German strategyof holding the Americans with infantry while driving the British into the sea with armour, grandiose on paper, looked less so to Dietrich, the commander of 1 SS panzer corps who was given the job to do by Rommel. He could muster at best 160 odd tanks from 21st PD and 12 SS (PZ Lehr was not expected until 8th June) and his attempt at a concerted drive past the strongpoint at Douvres la Delivrande, which still dominated a wide open gap between the Canadians and 3rd div, was foiled from the start. Shortage of fuel delayed the grouping of 12 SS, and by the time they got on the move 21 PD was already involved heavily with 3rd div. 12 SS simultaneously were drawn off by a Canadian thrust at the Carpiquet airfield. In consequence the major breakthrough to the sea by 160 tanks, planned for the morning, was whittled down until all that could be raised for this important enterprise, later in the day was 17 tanks and a battalion of infantry.

If you look back at Crockers choice on D-day, does he go for Caen all out, or does he reinforce the lightly armed airborne and close the gap between the Canadians and British 3rd div? He made the right choice in my view as the Germans knew this was the weak point. What good would a weak hold on Caen have been if the Germans had been able to run amock between the two divisions and the flanks of 3rd Brit div had been exposed?

Already infact Montgomery was making the enemy dance to his tune. The immediately available armour had been directed on Caen, as expected, and put into the attack piecemeal, as had been hoped. By drawing attention to his left Montgomery had aided his right, where aid was most welcome for the Americans at Omaha who had been held by a thin crust behind which were virtually no German reserves.

Ronald Lewin, Military commanders page 199-200

Not familiar with the above. What did they write? I take it they are Monty bashers. Didn't get far on internet search.

Good stuff guys.

What idiot wrote that Monty's men were on the verge of mutiny? What utter crap, what stupidity! Let me make it quite plain, here and now. Monty was looked upon by hos men as a great general, certainly not a WW1 type that cared not for mens lives. He was also a "Winner" he took on the full strength of the panzers around the Caen sector and destroyed their mighty panzer stregth peicemeal.

Who ever wrote that his men were on the point of mutiny, is talking absolute rubbish and must have soem ulterior purpose to make such utterly untrue claims. I can only speak for myself and my friends in my company. Monty was held in great respect,not only as a Winner but akso that he never wasted mens lives.
BRian

Absolutely agree with Brian's statement. I have never understood why some people are intent on putting blame on Monte for Caen

Sure the Americans made more ground in faster time after 6 June than the British, but don't forget how many tanks and infantry were engaged, destroyed and tied up in and around Caen by British forces- then imagine all of those tanks and infantry turned loose on the Americans instead - how would that have affected our progress?

And on a bigger point, how many more Germans would we Americans have faced in France had the British not prevailed in the Battle of Britain and North Africa?

Besides, I'll take the sentiments of a British soldier who was there and actually chewed the dirt under Monte's command over an armchair general any day.

I'm not getting on anyone, I'm glad to see the discussion, I just feel that one needs to really try and look at the situation from every angle before a final declaration of opinion is stated.

Paul

Excellent posts. I always enjoy reading the research you submit. I just hope this doesn't turn into another Monty vs. Patton thread. Can't we all agree that Monty and Patton both preformed well in their duties. Monty benefited from Patton and Patton benefited from Monty. Both men had faults and both men had positive attributes.

I certainly dont want this topic to turn into a Patton V Montgomery thing, thats not why I started it and we have had enough of those already. The aim is to show how other authors see the battle of Caen, plus Patton was not on the scene for sometime, so should not really be relevant. I think the links to those Patton sites are just a look at how some people view the war. Its really good to see a view such as Paul's.


Andy

Lt General Sir Brian Horrocks from his book "A Full life"

p184

Horrocks has just returned from a serious wounding he recieved in North Africa he is to take over 30 corps. For those who dont know, Horrocks is the General played by Edward Fox in the film a Bridge too far. He has just arrived in Normandy and as he approaches Monty's tactical HQ caravan 2 men come out, one being Monty and the other Ike. Horrocks had met Ike several times before but not recently, Ike turned to Horrocks and said, "Jorrocks, theres nobody Iam more glad to see out here than you". A glowing reference.

Horrocks was worried because he was still unwell and he thought Monty would spot this and send him home ASAP. But Monty did know how unwell he was but also knew that his experience was badly needed. So Horrocks eneters the caravan and thinks to himself

I had also been studying him (Monty), and wondering how he was standing up to the strain of this difficult time. From what I had heard in England criticisms about his handling of the battle were hostile. Monty had many enemies, and it looked as though the pack was moving in for the kill. This was all very different from the adulation of the 8th army days.

Yet it seemed to leave him completely unmoved. He explained to me that the battle was developing almost exactly in accordance with the plan which he had given out at his final conference in St Pauls school, London, a couple of weeks before D-day. This plan was basically simple, for the British and Canadians to go on attacking in the Eastern sector so as to draw to thier front the bulk of the German reserves, particularly their panzer divisions, and thus enable the Americans in the Western sector to capture the Cherbourg peninsular and breakout in a southerly and easterly direction. At that time on the British sector, fourteen British and Canadian divs were opposed by fourteen German divisions and 600 tanks, while nineteen US divisions were faced by only nine German divisions and 110 tanks. So the constant attacks on the eastern sector had fullfilled their purpose, and US forces were at that time breaking out of the beachhead. The whole front would then swing round, hingeing on the Eastern flank, and advance to the river Seine. The days of the bitter, close quarter fighting were nearly over..

I know, this is something being repeated but im trying to show that it was not just something in Montgomery's head.

Andy

Checked the site out. The author really hates Ike, SCHAEF and Monty. The chapter headed the three major errors are a hoot. I am not a Paton basher but this guy thinks Paton won the war on his own. As for your second quote from the site, well, the tears are blinding me.

Just a quick question that may or may not require a short answer: Does anyone know the reasons behind why the Brits and Canadiens were given their asigned beaches and the Americans theirs? Clearly Monty's strategy was to keep the German panzers occuppied around Caen with constant pressure. This strategy was sure to cause a high rate of casualties. Why were the Americans, with a much larger manpower pool, not selected for this task? Was it because of their relative inexperience? Or was it because more men were needed for the offensive breakout than on the pivot at Caen? I was just wondering and I don't think it was ever discussed before.

I think the answer lies in the long-term plans for supply after the Battle of Normandy.

Later, with plans to close on the German border, it was decided to keep the British and Canadians on the left - to clear and make use of the Channel Ports for resupply from the UK. The Americans meanwhile, would make use of the Brittany ports and Cherbourg for direct supply from the USA. I think in order to make this happen it was decided to land the Americans to the west and the British and Canadians to the east. For when the Armies pivoted round and advanced alongside one another, east towards Germany, that would bring the British and Canadians alongside the Channel. I think the exception to this was Le Havre, which the US used.

Bit of a confusing explanation, but it makes sense when you look at the map. Obviously the Armies couldn't swop places once ashore.


You've hit on a paradox that I spend quite a while trying to figure out myself. With the manpower problem in the British Army, it seems strange that the British were assigned the task of attrition - especially when so much is made of British General's wanting to avoid repeating the experience of WW1.

However, I get the impression that the German response to D-Day was not what Mongomery and the planners had thought it would be. I can't help but think that the planners believed that the German's would conduct a fighting retreat, but make a stand at the Seine or something - certainly out of the way of naval gunfire and in a better defensive line. Of course, I may be barking up the wrong tree here

But in the small sector of the front around Caen, the Americans greater manpower resources would have been useless - as there was no room to deploy large forces. Plus, as you yourself say, the Americans needed more manpower to make a breakout - not just south, but also up towards Cherbourg. The British Army lacked the strength to both guard the southern approaches to the Cotentin, advance up to Cherbourg, and south to St Lo. They did however have the strength to guard the flank of the Americans, which is why they were assigned that task.

IMHO

Yes it would seem that the bigger American force would fan out into the "broad front " we are discussing elsewhere on the threads. This being Eisenhower`s aspiration.

The supply route direct from America is another very plausable reason, I had never given that any consideration before.

Obviously I have no way of knowing what was the masterplan on where the troops should land, But it is fairly obvious to me, that our role to hold and destroy the Panzers, had to be on the Eastern Sector. For that is where the greatest danger would lie for the Enemy, That sudden break out from the Caen sector would create an enormouse problem, for it was nearest the Siene and could cut off the rest of the German army.

To be honest, it seemed to me any movement on the Eastern side created a near panic reaction. for in every case, as in Caen, and Goodwood, he piled in everything he had to stop us, and by doing so, fulfilled Monties plans. That is just what he wanted. And got.
I am still quite amazed at the assertion that Monty was facing a mutiny. How daft can you get?

Never underestimate this squeaky voiced, utterly ruthless, and quite brilliant general. He was completely in charge and "low and behold" what would happen if anyone tried to get in the way.
Brian

Monty's memoirs

The American breakout thrust was to be delivered Southwards down to the Loire and then to be developed eastwards in a wide sweep up to the Seine about Paris. This movement was designed to cut off all the enemy forces south of the Seine, over which river the bridges were to be destroyed by air action.

This strategy was evolved from consideration primarily of the layout of enemy reserve formations in western Eurp[e, the run of rail and road communications leading to Normandy and the immediate task of the operation which was to secure the ports.

The city of Caen was a vital road and rail communication center through which the main routes from east and south east passed. Since the bulk of the enemy mobile reserves was located north of the Seine they would have to approach Normandy from the east and might be expected to converge on Caen. Hence if a major threat to the enemy containing forces could be developed and sustained in the Caen sectort, his reserves would tend to become committed there.

So for Monty's plan to work it makes sense to sweep round from the West, to hold and grind down the Germans in the Caen sector especially as the Germans would think this would be the main area for a breakout, then when the time is right sweep out from the West.

My orders provided for an assault on a frontage of two armies. first US army on the right employing 2 divisions and second British army on the left with 3 divs. This arrangement of forces placed the American troops on the Atlantic flank, as they would ultimately be maintained direct from the US.

Andy

With these stories I hope those that read them will see that British 3rd division was far from being slow and that they were involved in heavy fighting. Also there are links to the Canadian 3rd division and their heavy fighting.


Norfolks
The 1st at Caen

http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/Royal_Nor...1st_at_caen.htm

7th at Caen

http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/Royal_Nor...7th_at_caen.htm


More on the Norfolks

http://www.norfolkbc.fsnet.co.uk/bc_obitua...e_frankland.htm


The Second Lincs in Normandy
http://www.secondlincs.co.uk/d_day.htm

Recollection of D Day 6 Jun 44 by Major Peter Cliffe
http://www.secondlincs.co.uk/pcdday.htm
http://www.secondlincs.co.uk/war_of_attrition.htm

http://www.secondlincs.co.uk/normandy.htm


The Canadians on D-day and Carpiquet

D-day

Germans counter attack

Carpiquet and Caen

Battle of attrition continues


51st Highland Division, Caen, Escoville, Cuverville
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A3098289



Les Davis
Tank Commander
Staffordshire Yeomanry,
C Squadron on D-Day.
http://www.warchronicle.com/staffsyeo/sold..._wwii/davis.htm

Lionel Knight
Staffordshire Yeomanry, C Squadron
http://www.warchronicle.com/staffsyeo/sold...wwii/knight.htm


Major R.R. Rylands “W” Coy. 2nd Bn. K.S.L.I. in Normandy
http://www.warchronicle.com/ksli/soldierst...coynormandy.htm

This 30 Corps boar that I have as my avatar, not big on the wedding tackle front is he?

Montgomery
The situation, 12 June

The beachheads had now been firmly linked into a continuous bridgehead on a front of over 50 miles (if Crocker had not of followed this order on D-day and went all out for Caen with the little he had ashore this may have been the case at this point) Varying in depth 8 to 12 miles. With the arrival of 51st division, the Orne bridgehead was more secure and additional bridging over the river and canal was put in hand (Brian and co)

We had firmly retained the initiative. The enemy ws engaging his formations piecemeal in response to our thrusts. I appreciated that the vigour of his attacks to the West of Caen would be further strengthened as fresh reserves on my Eastern flank was beginning to take shape.Meanwhile it was likely that he would react further to the threat to Cherbourg, to do this he would endeavour to hold open a corridor on the west of the contentin and try to hold our thrust towards St Lo.

At this stage, in spite of the signs of movement already mentioned, no enemy formation had made the difficult journey from North of the Seine, a long detour was imposed by the wrecked bridges over the river and the bulk of the 15th German army waited grimly for an assault in the Pas de Calais.

The weather remained a great anxiety. Our build up was already getting behind schedule, it reflects great credit on the Navy and the beach organizations that so much was accomplished in spite of the continually unfavourable weather conditions. During the first six days 326,000 men and 54,000 vehicles and 104,000 tons of stores had been landed.

It was inevitable that after the successful outcome of the assault , the pace of operations slowed down. The assault formations needed time for a breather, while they reorganized and re-absorbed the echelons which had been left behind for the first days, but without which no unit could function for long. The beach organization had to be established and built up to its full effiency. The whole admin machine had to commence functioning on shore and initial shortages made up.

As mentioned, the build up was falling behind schedule and this added to our difficulties.

In spite of these circumstances it was vital to retain the initiative, which could only be ensured by continuing the offensive. I therefore ordered a policy of limited offensive operations in furtherance of the plan, which were carried out although they often involved great risks. But the policy was successful mainly owing to the fine quality of the assaulting formations and the excellent support they were afforded by the allied air forces. My immediate objects remained to capture Cherbourg and Caen, and to develop the central sector of the bridgehead to Caumont and Villers bocage. Examination was made of the possibility of using airborne forces to hasten the capture of Caen, but conditions were found to be unsuitable for their deployment.

From Normandy to the Baltic by Field Marshall Montgomery page 56-57

Darn it, Andy. If I get fired, I am blaming you. You have given us so many good things to read. But don't get me wrong, keep 'em coming.

Andy,may I add some thing which reinforces your research , I have this from Stuart Hills
"By tank into Normandy" Hills was in the 8th Armoured brigade Normandy, he landed at Gold beach.

High Command wanted to continue putting pressure on the Germans in the Caen sectorto allow the American preparations further west to go ahead unhindered. This breakout , code named Cobra , began on July25 in the area of St Lo, but the British and Canadian forces had to keep attacking in order to prevent the Panzer Divisions disengaging and deploying to counter the American threat. So what was happening around Caen was very much part of the "Battle of the Breakout", even though the Americans stole the glory.

To which I will add - well done those Americans !

It certainly was Gary and is why Goodwood was launched, it should have coincided with Cobra but because of Bradley wanting more time it could not be launched simultaneously. But I will get to that later.

Andy

Villers bocage

Montgomery and Dempsey, had to devise a method of making the German position in Caen untenable. A direct assault on Caen was ruled out as being too costly and difficult. So, the decision was made to inject some movement into the frontline by trying to outflank the city to the west, possibly to combine with a parachute drop of British 1st Airborne. Operation Perch was born, and General Erskine's 7th Armoured Division was to be used to advance to Villers bocage. The Germans knew the importance of Villers Bocage and had sent the Panzer Lehr Division to occupy the area and then to allow 2nd Panzer Division to pass through and attack the Americans further west.

Now this engagement seems to be infamous with tea drinking. It makes me chuckle as what, no other allied soldier got thirsty? The 4th County of London Yeomanry advanced to Villers bocage as ordered reaching the small town on the morning of June 13th. 'A' Squadron of the regiment advanced to Point 213, some two miles along the road to Caen, while other units halted in and around the town itself.

Lt-Colonel Arthur, the Viscount Cranleigh, the commanding officer, had asked for time to carry out a proper reconnaissance of the area as German armoured cars had been spotted observing the advance south from Tilly-sur-Seulles. Orders were, however, to push on regardless (which, apart from the immediate aim, accorded with the Allies’ overall strategy of keeping the German armour away from the American front). Leaving the regimental HQ tanks at the top of the main street in Villers, ‘A’ Squadron was ordered forward to secure Point 213 about two km north-east up N175. On reaching Point 213, ‘A’ Squadron halted and the commanders, Cranleigh included, decided upon a staff discussion and briefing. It was during an Officers meeting in Villers that im ashamed to say that they got thirsty and boiled some water to make a hot drink, which just happened to be tea, which is probably ok if you think the area is safe. XXX Corps intelligence had no idea of the real opposition in the area.

The British had advanced out of Villers to Point 213, as they did they unknowingly passed a force of heavy Tiger tanks commanded by veteran tank ace Michael Wittman. He had six Tigers, plus troops and vehicles, positioned some 200 metres to the south of the N175. The British were completely unaware of the German’s presence.

Wittman launched his attack and caught the British completely off guard. His Tigers of engaged ‘A’ Squadron and the motorised infantry. There was little they could do, and the Cromwells and Fireflies were no match.
Wittman set off in a Tiger and cut in behind ‘A’ Squadron and began an assault in the British forces in Villers itself. He engaged infantry forces, light reconnaissance Stuart tanks, unarmed artillery observation tanks and eventually the regimental HQ Cromwells, under the temporary command of Major Carr. Carr attempted to engage Wittman’s tank but the 75mm shells bounced off and Carr’s tank was destroyed. The other Cromwells were also despatched, except for Captain Pat Dyas’s vehicle. He backed off the road and Wittman did not spot him as he drove past though the town. German infantry had also started to filter into the eastern end of the town in support of Witmman’s attack. Wittman continued his advance engaging the scattered remnants of the RHQ group. Dyas pursued him down the street, hoping to shoot the Tiger in the rear.

Retreating British elements informed ‘B’ Squadron of the situation and Wittman soon found himself in a duel with a Firefly commanded by Sergeant Lockwood at the western end of the town. Witmman then began to withdraw, engaging the luckless Dyas en route. Dyas also obtained a hit on the Tiger, but to no avail and Dyas’s Cromwell was soon knocked out. As Wittman moved back through the town his Tiger was immobilised by a 6-pdr anti-tank gun at very close range and Wittman and his crew escaped on foot.
Wittman escaped and returned shortly afterwards with four more Tigers and a Panzer IV. Heavy fighting ensued in the town with the British tanks, firing by sighting down the barrel because of the short range. A number of tanks from both sides were destroyed, with some of the German ones even being set on fire by the British with petrol. The 1/7th Queen's slowly fought their way into Villers Bocage and went "Tiger hunting" with their Piats, while 6-pdr anti-tank guns waited to ambush any German tank that moved around the town.

Meanwhile the men of 4th CLY and Rifle Brigade at Pt 213 were effectively cut of and although the artillery spotters from 5th RHA were able to call down supporting fire, they could not find a way out, as by now Panzer Grenadiers were all around the position. Eventually only about 30 men would make it out of Pt 213 to rejoin the Division.

1/7th Queens lost 8 officers ad 120 men, while destroying nine German Tanks. 1/7th Queens were driven back Between 1700 and 2030 hours, the British withdrew from Villers-Bocage and set up a defensive ‘Brigade Box’ to the north-west of the town, but the position was deteriorating for the British in the sector and Operation Perch came to an end.

Now the battle at Villers is always remembered for Wittman, but many people who don’t read up on their history or just read say a book by Ambrose will not know about the battle of the box. Villers was not a defeat, it was a defeat, a draw and a victory. Victory came during the famous battle of "the box". The Germans were given a beating and 2nd PZ div's attempted counter attack between British and American armies was stopped. The 'box' formation was a throw back to the old desert days where each unit could provide support to the others involved. In this box was the remaining two squadrons of 4th CLY, 8th Hussars, 11 Hussars, 5th RTR, 1/5th and 1/7th Queens, 1st Rifle Brigade and 5th RHA. Covering the rear of the box were 1st RTR and 1/6th Queens.

The Germans launched an attack on the British Box, the German formation was all infantry, and the 5th RTR sent out a patrol which engaged the Germans. The German PZ grens were decimated, even the old veteran crews from previous campaigns were horrified at the slaughter. The Germans attacked again later on, this time with armour and infantry and the British RA gave support. At the end of the battle only 3 Cromwells were knocked out, but 20 German tanks and hundreds of German Panzer Grens were lying dead or wounded round the British box.

Sources

Villers Bocage Through The Lens Daniel Taylor
Steel Inferno I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy by Michael Reynolds.
The Desert Rats 7th Armoured Division 1940-1945 by
Robin Neillands
Churchills desert rats by Delaforce

How true is that!! The impression I got when I first read about this battle was one of Wittman cruising up and down the road destroying enemy tanks at will before leaving! At that point the story leaves villers bocage and moves onto the next chapter of the battle for Normandy.


Who'd be an allied tanker in Normandy eh. Although the Firefly could match the Tiger in hitting power it was still a Sherman, and therefore had the same flaws. Cromwells and Churchills were essentially infantry support tanks and stood lttle chance against a panther and virtually none against a Tiger.
Probably a case of get your shot in first and then get out quick!!

Thats the only thing that many books mention mate, Wittman and how he alomost took on and destroyed 7th armoured div singlehandedly.


Because the British forces had to pull back from Villers and the plan to cut off Panzer Lehr failed, many were shocked. Some were expecting a quick breakout from Normandy after the success of the first few days. But what Villers did show up was a weakness in infantry and armour co-ordination. But really it was not as gloomy as many thaought, what Villers showed up was the lack of permanent German infantry formations in the British sector, they were being sucked in and grinded down, and the German armour was having to operate as armoured pillboxes instead of being able to attack the British in force and push them back into the sea.

A Panzer Lehr mark IV crew

We spent our first fortnight in action against the British. It was like a game of Red indians only deadly serious, the business of hide and seek to evade the sharp eyes of the fighter bombers. The tank skipper got out to reconnoitre along a sunken lane. He crawled through the hedges. He inspected every inch of ground. He had moved up and down the lane about a dozen times. You'd think he was choosing a building plot to which another crew member remarked, better a building plot than a tomb. The tanke were concealed in haystacks. The infantrymen around them were camouflaged by bushes, sheaves of oats, and broken off branches and twigs. The first few hours were spent in camouflage. Branches and twigs were carefully cut out of the hedge, and the tanks decorated with them until they seemed to have been spirited away. Time and again a man would go off to see whether the camouflage looked genuine.

Next, the tank tracks in the field of oats had to be obliterated or they would be a clear sign post for any fighter bomber. Laboriously each blade was bent again and made to stand upright.

The first two days were tolerable. Water for washing and hot food were not yet missed. The men in the tank were not yet getting on each others nerves. mentally they surveyed their whole field of fire. They became familiar with the distances. In an emergency they would not have to spend long calculating.

On the third day the long awaited British offensive began. Other attacks followed almost daily and were usually accompanied by a very heavy preliminary bombardment in which naval guns were sometimes used, but always the strength and depth of the German defenses foiled the attacker. By the eight night, still camouflaged , the crews found life in the conctricted bowels of the tank almost intolerable, they had ceased to be amused any lonegr when one of their number asked to be handed a shell case which acted as a chamber pot. By enduring this incarceration for fourteen days, by careful camouflage, by knowing every foot of the ground in front of them, by never relaxing their watch, and by the effectiveness of their guns, these highly trained and brave German tank crews broke the momentum of the 2nd army's attacks.


But the cost was high, since through the misemployemnt of their tanks in tactics of this kind, the Germans steadily eroded their strength, both in men and machines. During the prolonged and inconclusive battles round Villers bocage, the crack Panzer Lehr lost about 100 tanks. Bayerlein, its very experienced commander, reckoned that this fighting had so weakened his division that it could no longer contemplate staging an armoured thrust towards the sea which the Germans had hoped to drive a wedge between the British and American armies by pushing their tanks to the coast. The Germans also staged several small counter attacks, especially iin the Tilly Sur Seulles area, and these had proved almost as costly as the British attacks.

By the 19th June, a fortnight after D-day, the first phase of the fighting in Normandy may be said to have ended. Montgomery was well satisfied by the way in which the German armoured strength was being steadily eroded. But the failure to capture Caen and advance towards Falaise was beginning to cause considerable anxiety in some quarters, especially amaongst the most senior RAF officers.


Tilly Sur Seulles is mentioned above, im not sure if many of you will have heard of this place and the fighting that went on there. While 7th armoured were flanking Villers, 50th Division were taking on Panzer Lehr. I know Mat (Bobfish) has studied this part of the battle very closely, perhaps Mat you could give us a little bit on how bad the fighting was around Tilly and how it changed hands?


Andy

Extract from the war diaries of 4 CLY: For Villers Bocage

13.6.1944: Regiment moved at first light towards Villers Bocage 8157, A Sqdn leading followed by A Company Rifle Brigade. No opposition. A Sqdn reached feature east of Villers Bocage map reference 8358. Column split at map reference 823578 by two Tiger tanks (Michael Wittman). RHQ brewed up completely. A Sqdn continued to take up battle positions and B Sqdn hold town. Unable to get through to A Sqdn who were attacked at 10.00 by Tigers and infantry. They called for immediate assistance, but none could get through. At 10.30 A Sqdn reports position untenable, withdrawal impossible. At 10.35 all stations go off the air. B Sqdn ordered to hold village at all cost. After six hours of street battles destroyed four Tigers and three mark IVs. At 16.00 B Sqdn reported village still held, but enemy infantry reported in area, map reference 820975, and an attack by the Queens failed to clear the opposition. The Commanding Officer 'The Viscount Cranley' was missing and Major Aird, B Sqdn leader, took command. Major Aird, now acting CO, ordered to withdraw Regiment to 780580, and this was carried out without further loss, while C Sqdn covered the withdrawal. Vehicle casualties 20 Cromwells, 4 Fireflys, 3 Humber Scout cars, 3 Stuarts, and 1 Half Track.

Andy , I am impressed by the "box formation" have you any thing in your references such as a diagram which shows the layout ?. To be honest I`m imaginging it to be like a Roman army tactic with a square of shields and spears !.

Villers would make a great docu-drama.

Sure thing mate




Villers Bocage

More on the Box

The third battle of Villers took place the next day. The division was now esconced in a defensive box or island on high ground east of Amaye Sur Seulles waiting until relief came from 50th Division fighting towards Tilly. The box was 2000 yards east to west and 1500 yards north to south. The 1/5th Queens and the 4th CLY were in the south west corner, 1/7th Queens to the east, 1st RB facing north. All of 22nd armoured brigade with 8th and 11th Hussars plus 5th RHA were concentrated, every wood and orchard congested with transport, tanks, guns and troops.

From Churchills Desert rats - Patrick Delaforce

Yes, thats impressive.

Andy/Bobfish

Still wading through the links mentioned in this thread. With regard to Operation Perch codename Wild Oats, why was the airborne drop of the 1st Battalion not carried out? Do you think if it had it may have secured the town that bit quicker or was it too dangerous to drop the Paras in the vicinity due to the heavy German armour?

Great research.

Hi Ian, ive not found much on the reasons why 1st airborne division were not dropped during Perch other than what Montgomery says, in that the conditions were not right. I think Mat and I agree that we both think it would have been a disaster for 1st airborne if they had of been dropped.

This was the plan apparently from the book Caen - anvil of victory

Monty, Dempsey and Bradley met in a field near Port en Bessin to disscuss a plan. 21st and 12th SS had now dug in, on the defensive around Caen, they were to be encircled simultaneously form east and west. A left hook out of the airborne bridgehead east of the Orne was to be made by 51st HD and 4th armoured brigade, with Cagny as their objective; the more powerful right hook was to be delievered from Bayeux by 30 corps, with 7 armoured division leading towards Villers Bocage and Evrecy. When the tips of the two pincers had reached Cagny and Evrecy respectively, the 1st British airborne division was to be dropped between them thus completing the encirclement of Caen.

That was the idea which didnt come off, it was after Villers that the British were now faced with four German armoured divisions and Monty did not think he was strong enough at that time to carry out both offensives East and West of the bridgehead.

I'm in the opposite camp to Mat & Andy (just for a change!). I think, had the conditions been more favourable, Operation Wild Oats, in support of 7th Armoured would have been as succesfull, and equally, as costly as the operations by 6th Airborne east of the Orne.


But, the conditions were by no means ideal and the operation was rightly cancelled on 20th. Not for the first time, and certainly not the last, German stubborness and tenacity in defence would influence Monty's 'best laid plans'.

Steve

Yeah, I shall. I'm not contributing much to this thread I admit, mainly because I'm being distracted by my new MP3 player.

Either it's just my habit for getting sidetracked, but whenever I talk about Tilly, I have to go into a bit more detail about XXX Corps itself in the first few days - not just the actions around Tilly-sur-Seulles, but also the fighting around Point 103 and the Mobile Column.

Basically, the fighting around Tilly has its origins in Phase Two of the Second Army operation order. This called for XXX Corps to advance inland, secure Villers Bocage and make contact with the First US Army somewhere around Caumont. At the same time as this was happening, I Corps would pivot on Caen and maintain contact with XXX Corps. This was intended to have been completed by around D+4. A tad optimistic.

For D-Day, XXX Corps consisted of 50th (Northumbrian) Division and 8th Armd Bde. Both veteran units. The follow up force was 7th Armoured Divison - the Desert Rats. Another Division famous for its escapades in the desert.

For its D-Day objectives, 50th Division were to capture Bayeux and reach the line of the Bayeux - Caen railway, in line with the Canadians on their left. Once that was done, 8th Armoured Brigade were to form a Mobile Column and push inland to capture Villers Bocage. Once there they would be reinforced by 7th Armd and 50th Div, defensive positions set up (forming a Firm Base) and XXX Corps would prepare for the next advance.

However it all went awry on D-Day itself. As we know, the seaborne divisons were some way off their objectives by nightfall, and parts of 8th Armd Bde hadn't managed to land at all. On D+1 50th Division carried out their tasks, seizing Bayeux and establishing themselves immediately south and south-east of the city, and also clearing ground to the west. Naturally for this they needed Armoured support, and so 8th Armd Bde was unable to start their advance. It wasn't until late on June 7th that the codeword was given to assemble the Mobile Column and head out to Villers Bocage.

Now, Brigadier Cracroft, the commander of 8th Armoured Brigade chose two routes to advance. Believing that any German forces moving to the beachhead would advance direct up the Bayeux - Tilly - Villers Bocage road, Cracroft elected to travel a less obvious and direct route. Also, to allow for more flexibility he elected to advance on two roads, roughly parallel with one another. If resistance was encountered on one, he could switch the other. Good tactics that would hope bypass major resistance and leave it to the infantry to mop up.

Cracroft's force consisted of the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 24th Lancers, 1st Dorset (from 50 Div), 61st Recce Regt plus attached Artillery, Engineers, Anti-Tank and Machine Guns units.

June 8th

The force assembled overnight on June 7th, and set off on June 8th. And again, things began to go wrong and the advance was held up.

There were two reasons for this, one was due to the enemy, and the other was down to the tactics employed. During the night of the 7th June, 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment had arrived on the front, and moved into the line between Audrieu and Norrey-en-Bessin, facing the Canadians and also the front that 8th Armd hoped to advance through. Early on June 8th the SS attacked Putot-en-Bessin, partially overrunning the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and seizing the town, before advancing forward. It was this advance that the 24th Lancers - moving on the left-hand axis, ran into. Several tanks were knocked out but some SS were also taken prisoner.

Luckily, they may have blunted the advance of the 26th SS Pz Gren (the Canadian Scottish attacked later and retook Putot-en-Bessin).

However one problem highlighted by this brief skirmish was the need for infantry support - had 24th Lancers had a battalion of infantry with them, then things may have been different. Of course, whether the advance would have made much headway is impossible to say. But either way, the left-hand axis was closed.

On the right-hand axis, through Audrieu, 61st Recce Regiment were also held up along the Bayeux - Caen railway. 88's were set up along the line of the railway and there were isolated German's in Loucelles, the village behind the Recce. Again, the one thing sorely needed was infantry, as the 61st Recce were unable to make any progress against the entrenched guns and numerous German's. The motor-battalion of 8th Armd hadn't been included in its D-Day manifest, and instead, 1 Dorsets from 50 Div had been attached to the Brigade. These moved up, and by nightfall the railway had been crossed and the Brigade were in the nrothn outskirts of Audrieu.

As darkness began to fall, Cracroft sent forward a small detachment to the west of Audrieu, outflanking the town and occupying the heights of Point 103. This small force consisted of a few tanks from the Sherwood Rangers, and were later reinforced by a machine-gun company and some anti-tank guns.

June 9th

The threat from the north forced the SS to pull back. The HQ of the 12th SS Recce was in the Chateau in Audrieu, and this was evacuated sometime on June 8th/9th - after massacring 24 Canadians and 2 Britishers taken prisoner that morning, in the gardens of the Chateau.

Early on June 9th, 1 Dorsets and 4th/7th DG advanced through Audrieu, still engaged in fairly heavy fighting. After requesting more infantry, Cracroft received the 8th Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry from 50th Division. These and the tanks of the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry were sent across country to reinforce the force on Point 103. By 1300, Point 103 was firmly in British hands.

Point 103 and the ridge is quite a dominating position - it slopes down towards Fontenay-le-Pesnel. Fontenay lies in a valley, with the ground climbing again to the south where you can see the high ground of Tessel-Bretteville and the Rauray Spur. Point 103 also overlooks the River Seulles valley, and the road from Bayeux to Tilly. It's quite flat - no massive changes in elevation, but an elevation it is nonetheless.

Once on Point 103, the advance south was continued, with the next major obstacle being the small village of St Pierre. This village lies on east back of the River Seulles (though 'River' is perhaps overstating the case). Tilly-sur-Seulles is on the other side of the river - about 200m away across the low-lying grassland/floodplain and river that separates the two. With St Pierre in British hands, then it was possible to exploit both east - towards Fontenay, or west towards Tilly.

This attack was launched around 1730hrs, and 8th DLI and there support fought their way into the village. However any attempts to move into Tilly were denied by the enemy, and some recce units that went south from St Pierre also ran into enemy opposition. Point 103 was strengthened by the 1st Dorsets and 8th DLI remained in St Pierre with a squadron of 24th Lancers in support.

Map: the Mobile Column on June 8th & 9th (forgive me if I've missed anything. I hate Paint).


By now, Panzer Lehr Division had arrived, making their first co-ordinated attack of the campaign, along the Bayeux road. This attack fell on the 6th DLI, dug in south of Bayeux. The German's first opened fire on the DLI, and then tried outflanking A Company dug in on some crossroads. Unfortunately for them, this flanking move took them right infront of B Company who beat off the attack. However the German's tried again an hour later, this time with tanks. A tank was spotted moving in on B Company, an anti-tank gun fired at it, hitting the tank but not knocking it out. In turn, the anti-tank gun was hit and disabled - wounding the five-man crew. Six other tanks then attacked B Company, who broke them up with artillery, and in the lull that followed, hastily regrouped their anti-tank forces. Some M10's arrived and by 20:00 these were in action against another German attack. One M10 was damaged, but the enemy responsible was KO'd by a second M10. The German's fell back and didn't try again. Three enemy MkIV's had been knocked out, with the 6th Battalion's casualties being six men wounded.

Another planned German move, that of a thrust east of the River Seulles, was pre-empted by the British moves south along Point 103.

June 10th

By now, 22nd Armoured Brigade of 7th Armoured Division had come ashore and were ready for action. The Rats were ordered to pass through 50th Division and head down the Bayeux - Tilly road towards Villers Bocage. This advance was to be in two bounds and was condenamed Operation Perch. With 4th County of London Yeomanry on the right (the Bayeux - Tilly road main road) and 5th RTR on the left (passing through Ellon, Juaye Mondraye, Bernieres and Lingevres). Firstly they would establish themselves along the Hottot ridge, where 56th Independent Infantry Brigade would hold while the armour advanced towards Villers Bocage for the enxt bound.

The idea was that when 7th Armoured got into Tilly-sur-Seulles, they would be alongside the forward elements of 8th Armoured Brigade - who would then continue their advance on the left of 7th Armoured Brigade and onto the Rauray Spur.

8th Armoured Brigade
Early hopes for a continuation of the advance were foliled when 8th DLI in St Pierre were suddenly and swiftly attacked early in the morning.

"Throughout the night there was nothing to be heard save counter shelling from both Artillery. Stand To passed without incident, but at 0615 hours the counter-attack came with great suddeness, the brunt beging borne by the Right forward company - C Company"
War Diary - 8th Battalion the Durham Light Infantry

C Company were the most westerly company of the battalion, dug in around the church next to the Seulles, just over from Tilly itself. The German's attacking were from 901st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, of Panzer Lehr Division and quickly overran the forward elements of C Company. A platoon of D Company, in the south-east corner of the village was also forced back. The survivors fell back and the battalion concentrated in the north-east of the village, with German's attacking from all points of the compass except north.

By the afternoon, the attacks had been halted, with help from artillery and the RAF. The Durham's sending fighting patrols forward but remaining in their positions on the edge of the village.

However that, and the news from 7th Armoured Division, prevented any further movement during the day.


7th Armoured Division
7th Armoured moved out from Bayeux early in the morning. Some way down the Bayeux - Tilly road, 5th RTR turned off onto their separate axis of advance. The 4th CLY first encountered the enemy in Jerusalem - a small crossroads a few miles north of Tilly. here they knocked out a MkIV tank, but were in turn subjected to friendly fire from 8th Armoured Brigade, up on Point 103. A Company of the 1st Rifle Brigade - the motor-battalion in 22nd Armd Bde, was sent into Jerusalem to clear the houses.

"The tanks with A Company destroyed the German tank alright, and they successfully worked all along the village until they got to the far end when they came under mortar fire and unfortunately lost several men, of whom 2 or 3 were killed. They also had a couple of casualties caused by phosphorous burns when passing a KO'd British vehicle which had some smoke bombs in it and happened to go off just at the one moment they were passing it."
War Diary - 1st Rifle Brigade

Again, the main problem was infantry support. Although 22nd Armoured Brigade had an entire infantry brigade under command, they were too far back in the column. Each Armoured Regiment thus had only one rifle company in which to clear a path for the armour. As Brigadier Hinde was to remark in a few days, the need in this type of country is for a small number of tanks supported by lots of infantry. Not vice versa. It was part of the learning cuve, 7th Armoured were used to operating in the desert, with nice long fields of fire and plenty of room to manouver. Here in the Bocage, it was an unnerving experience having Panzer Grenadiers jumping on your tank. Sunken lanes allowed little room for rapid redeployment. Overhanding tree branches obstructed a Commander's view, and the close country made it possible for enbemy soldiers to lay in wait, sniping the commander or ambushing the tank with a Panzerfaust.

4th CLY continued their advance south anbd were again held up a mile or so north of Tilly, at the small hamlet of Marcel where there were two bridges crossing a small stream. Infantry was needed. The 2nd Glosters were attached to the 4th CLY, but as stated, they were too far back in the regimental column. The roads were jammed with the vehicles of the Armoured Regiment and their attachments. Byt the time 2nd Glosters came up, it was almost too late to continue the advance. The bridges were cleared and mined, and the British moved back to laager for the night.

On the right flank, 5th RTR had also had a trying day. The small lanes around Ellon and Bernieres were no place for tanks, and their infantry detachment - I COmpany 1st Rifle Brigade, were also soon clearing hedges and orchards. One set of houses had to be cleared three times, as the enemy infiltrated back into them.

"I hate this game of clearing villages or houses. Against a determined enemy, it can never be done without a loss of some sort and although always successful in the end, I feel it is an expensive business and something which I would always prefer someone else was asked to do"
War Diary - 1st Rifle Brigade

At one point, a tank of 5th RTR belonging to a Lt Haywood also happened across and enemy tank laager. One MkIV was brewed up while he withdrew. The advance was slow, and the enemy had set up roadblocks along the way. Bernieres Bocage was reached, and two Cromwell's lost to a tank believed to be a Panther. The day's action had cost 5th RTR seven men killed, one wounded, and three missing. They laagered in Ellon, not far from where they had started.

Map: June 10th



June 11th
A change in policy was instigated for June 10th. By now, each Armoured regiment of 7th Armoured had an entire infantry battalion under their command. The command was split, with CO 22nd Armoured Brigade being responsible for the right hand axis (5th RTR and 2nd Essex) and CO 56th Infantry Brigade in command of the left (4th CLY and 2nd Glosters).

On 8th Armoured Brigade's front, it was felt that the weight of the enemy opposition prevented any immediate advance south - but again, if 7th Armoured made it into Tilly-sur-Seulles, then the way would be open to head south. Also, a plan was made for 69th Infantry brigade, of 50th Division, to advance east from Audrieu-Point 103 and seize Point 102 (try not to get confused between 103 and 102), Cristot and Brouay, thus widening the salient and strengthening the position of 8th Armd. The enemy had been infiltrating into Audrieu through the clsoe country to the east, and it was felt that this needed to be prevented. It would also strengthen the link between them and the Canadian 3rd Division.

8th Armoured Brigade
Although technically I shouldn't give that title now, seeing as 69th Brigade were now involved, I will do so anyway.

69th Brigade were to launch two separate attacks. 7th Green Howards were to attack Brouay, which formed a nasty little salient between 50 Div and 3rd Canadian Div. Meanwhile 6th Green Howards plus tank support were to attack from Point 103 and Le Haut d'Audrieu across country to Point 102. Meanwhile 5th East Yorks were to relieve the 1st Dorset's on Point 103.

I wrote this a while ago about the 6th Green Howards:
http://forums.wildbillguarnere.com/index.p...ndpost&p=136109

7th Green Howards advanced towards Brouay and were swiftly pinned down around the railway embankment. The embankment at Brouay has only a few crossing points that are easily defended. Anyone or anything moving over the embankment is skylined and the whole railway can be easily dominated by fire. The 7th GH got into trouble pretty soon after starting. An attempt to outflank the enemy proved impossible owing to a minefield, and the Green Howard's fell back.

5th East Yorks arrived on Point 103 by about 1830hrs, and hadn't been there long when a large armoured counter-attack hit them. This attack, by the II/130 Pz Regt of Panzer Lehr came in from the direction of Fontenay. Reports of Tigers in this attack abound, and the enemy had also set up some 88's at long range, which engaged any British tanks. Four enemy tanks actually overran some infantry positions- to quote Brigadier Cracroft "and for a short while pandemonium reigned" but they were eventually seen off. Cracroft believed that eighteen enemy tanks had been involved "mostly Tigers with a sprinkling of MkIV's" - but as the only Tigers were bloody miles away, it could be that they were all MkIV's, or Panthers. The attack had finally fizzled out by 22:30, but all units involved had suffered heavy losses.

During this attack, 8th DLI, still in St Pierre, also came under fire. For a short while the battalion was actually cut off and B Company's positions were penetrated - the company OC being killed. One tank was knocked out and the German's withdrew.

Although the German attack had failed in its objective, they had succeeded in forcing the British to break off their attack on Point 102.

Map: 69th Bde and 8th Armd Bde on June 10th.



7th Armoured
June 11th was to bring another trying day for 7th Armoured. 5th RTR pushed forward down their axis of advance, losing a tank at Bernieres. Then the Regiment advanced across the fields towards Lingevres. This ground inbetween bernieres and Lingevres is all very open, and very flat.

A large orchard, sat on the north-west outskirts of Lingevres was to prove a hotspot -and as 5th RTR approached it, a gun opened fire from within the orchard, knocking out two Cromwell's and a Firefly. I Company, 1st Rifle Brigade were sent into the wood, and advanced about 300yds into the wood when they were ambushed. One section was "rushed" by 40 German's. A German tank, reported in 5th RTR's diary as a Panther, and in 1st RB's diary as a Tiger, was sat in the wood. Successive attempts to knock this tank out failed, and 5th RTR lost two tanks to it. 5th RTR pulled back, bringing I Company with them, and the 2nd Essex were sent for. 5th RTR lost eight men killed, and two wounded.

The Essex were at this point, ensconced around Juaye Mondraye, and moved forward at 18:00 to attack the wood, with a moving barrage preceding them. By 19:15, they were in position. The wood was then found to be a nasty defensive position, occupying a forward slope. As already discovered, the wood wasn't thick enough to keep out tanks. Overnight on June 11th, the Essex were heavily counter-attacked. At least one, possibly two, flame-throwing Half-Track's were involved in this attack, and possibly a Panther. The battalion suffered 150 casualties, but held firm.

Meanwhile, 4th CLY had begun their advance early that morning with 2nd Glosters clearing the two bridges at Marcel. The advance went on, but two Panthers on the Tilly - Bayeux road held up the advance. One of these Panthers was apparently immoveable, with a second one covering. A troop of C Squadron worked round to the left and knocked out the immoveable tank, and meanwhile some men of the Glosters, with a PIAT, knocked out the other.

By 17:15, the Glosters fought their way into Tilly-sur-Seulles. One diary mentions the presence of SP Guns and enemy tanks. An AVRE was knocked out in the town and a large amount of KO'd transport was reported along the road from Tilly to Buceels.

"Fighting within the village became very close and confused, street and house-fighting developed. Enemy snipers were everywhere including the church and infirmary, which was later burnt out."
War Diary - 2nd Glosters

The German's had begun counter-attacking, infiltrating to the west. Also, the southern part of Tilly (which occupies higher ground) was still held by the enemy, obstructing any movement south. An attempt was made by 4th CLY to flank Tilly to the west, but an entire troop of four tanks was ambushed and knocked out in a sunken lane south of Marcel. It was decided to dig-in north of Tilly, and to push the newly arrived 131st Infantry Brigade (of 7th Armoured Div) through the next day.

The Glosters began withdrawing about 22:00. One interesting anecdote tells of a German motorcyclist being captured. The captor then rode on the pillion of the bike, as his prisoner drove the bike into British lines. Fourteen men were cut off in Tilly, laying up for 7hrs until returning to British lines with their wounded.

The days fighting cost the Glosters four men killed, twenty-two wounded and five missing. 4th CLY had two men wounded, and eighteen men missing.

Map: 7th Armd on June 11th


June 12th
Early moves on June 12th saw the 2nd Essex pulled out of the wood where they had suffered close to 150 casualties during the night.

Now, I must confess to be appallingly uninformed of this day. As the Glosters war diary stated above, 131st Infantry Brigade were ordered to continue the attacks on Tilly, and the Tilly - Balleroy road. However the War Diary for 131st Brigade is very sparse on the days activities. However it seems likely that certainly 1/5th Queen's attacked, and also 1/6th Queen's. I have a sneaking feeling that the former of the two attacked Tilly-sur-Seulles, and the latter Verrieres. But this is something I haven't got round to following up yet. 4th CLY were also in action on this day, who in their war diary mention "Verrieres strongly held by the enemy".

Either way, in the afternoon, as Andy has already related, orders came through to switch the advance round on a large right-hook on Villers Bocage. 7th Armoured thus left the Tilly battle and headed off to encounter Michael Wittman on Point 213.

8th Armoured Brigade
8th Armd Bde had had a comparitively quieter day, if "quiet" is the word to use. A Recce by 24th Lancers found enemy armour around Point 102. Some tanks were lost to Panzerfausts.

As a good indicator that the nature of the campaign was changing, 8th Armoured were to ordered to hand over command of their front to GOC 50th Division - Major General Graham. He also ordered that St Pierre be given up, which was done so. St Pierre would eventually fall around June 18th, to 49th Division.


June 13th
The past week, 151st (Durham) Infantry Brigade had been holding their positions south of Bayeux. Now they were put into attack - less 8th DLI, who had come back under command of 50th Division and were resting after their time in St Pierre.

For the attack, 6th DLI were to bypass Tilly and pass to the east of it, with their objective the Hottot - Juvigny road. 9th DLI were on the right, to move parallel with 6th DLI and clear the small hamlet of Verrieres and up onto the high ground at Hottot.

6th DLI moved down the Bayeux - Tilly road, and left the main road at a place called Pont de la Guillette, next to the bridges that the Glosters had cleared the day before. They moved up a small sunken road but as they did so were heavily mortared and fired on by machine-guns. A Company lost all their communications and were pinned down. One platoon advanced on a farmhouse until they to were pinned and their officer wounded. B Company were sent round to the right of the farm, to put in a flanking attack up the line of a small stream. But as they did so they were hit by Nebelwerfers, killing two and wounding six in the leading platoon. The attack continued, but the stream was held by the enemy and the OC of B Company abandoned the idea of a flanking move. The farmhouse was throughly stonked and Twelve Platoon of B coy advanced under cover of smoke.

"The platoon reached the farmhouse under smoke, but was shot up badly from the hedge to the right and from immediately in front from the road. Major Atkinson again re-organised his men and put in a further attack supported by one tank. The attack was again broken up by heavy machine-gun and mortar fire and B Company withdrew slightly from the open-ground and re-organised along a hedgerow some 200yds from the farm"
War Diary - 8th Battalion the Durham Light Infantry.

The rest of the battalion made contact with B coy, and tried to dig in, but the Brigade commander ordered the battalion back for the night. Seven men had been killed and forty-nine wounded.

9th DLI had made even less progress, advancing forward to be hit by fire from the woods to the north-east of Verrieres. From looking at a map, it almost seems as if both battalions had attacked on either side of a salient, and were consequently hit from the flanks. Given the close country, reduced visibility and also undulating terrain, infiltration and concealment were very effective tactics.

June 13th also brought the debacle at Point 213. With 7th Armoured needing reinforcements, General Bucknell elected to continue attacking the Tilly - Lingevres - Balleroy line, believing he could unhinge it. I can't help but feel that was a bad decision.

Map - 151st Brigade on June 13th.


Maps are a bit useless for this day really, due to the scale.

June 14th
The attacks were continued, this time 6th DLI were to attack Verrieres, and 9th DLI were to capture Lingevres. This was made even more encessary by the need to breakthrough the Tilly defences and get down to 7th Armoured.

The attack on Verrieres encountered a strong enemy line that held them up for a while just infront of Verrieres.

“The enemy was well dug-in on the forward edge of a wood and held his fire until our leading troops were 150yds away. Then the whole enemy line opened up with machine guns (estimated at least twelve in number). The advance was held up; artillery engaged the whole front of the wood but did not knock out the enemy completely.”
War Diary - 6th Durham Light Infantry

A large ditch had been turned into a strongpoint, but with arillery and armour (the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards) the advance continued. The enemy fell back, leaving a few snipers behind and D and B Companies pushed on through the farm-buildings.

"B Company went through Verrieres without opposition, crossed the stream and paused on the left of the track to allow D Company to come level with them on the right. The one tank supporting this move forward spotted an enemy tank Mk V at Los le Gallois crossroads, covering the track. D Company were heavily engaged from the front and were unable to get on. B Company continued to advance and reached a position 200yds from the main road where they were shot up by machine guns and the machine gun from the tank. The left platoon of B Company went forward under cover of the hedgerows and one section reached the line of the road [Tilly – Lingevres road]. This platoon was fired on from the left and the leading section was cut off, four men being killed and two wounded. This section lay doggo in a ditch for two days and four survivors were picked up by B Company when the Battalion reached the main road on June 16th”.
War Diary - 6th Durham Light Infantry (My notes are in square brackets)

The battalion was pulled back before dark to just north of Verrieres, having suffered 23 men killed, 65 wounded and 15 missing during the day. B Squadron of the 4th/7th DG lost five tanks and twelve men - of which five were killed and four missing.

Meanwhile, in Lingevres, 9th DLI were having an even stickier time. The attack jumped off at 10:20, after heavy artillery and air preparation. The battalion and its armour moved across the fields and were soon taking heavy casualties - from the wood that had caused the 2nd Essex so much trouble a few days earlier. The woods were cleared at heavy cost, enemy tanks and Spandau's were in the wood. A Company were pinned and C Company advancing slowly. B Company went forward, and it lost every officer except one within minutes. While trying to reorganise the advance, the CO of the battalion was killed by a mortar,but the 2i/c took over, and the battalion pushed on down the road into Lingevres. There was hand to hand fighting in the ruins of the village but the enemy was steadily pushed out.

With the village occupied, the German's mounted a counter-attack. The defence of Lingevres was really quite something, five Panthers were KO'd by the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, and it's mentioned here:

http://forums.wildbillguarnere.com/index.p...50&hl=lingevres

June 15th
June 15th was a day of reorganising and patrolling. Both sides paused to regain their strength.

June 16th
Little change, except 6th DLI, dug in around Verrieres, moved forward to the Tilly - Lingevres - Balleroy road. This was done without incident.

June 17th
The attack on Tilly was resumed, this time by 6th DLI and 2nd Essex. The Essex were to attack down the Bayeux - Tilly road and seize the crossroads. meanwhile 6th DLI were to advance parallel to the Essex, and then swing round to the south of the village, thus snaring it in a pincer.

Accounts vary as to the progress of the Essex. By all indications, they got into some confused fighting in the woods to the north of Tilly. Artillery had to be called in, and different companies were held up by snipers and spandau's as they slowly edged forward. By around 22:00, the Essex were in possession of the northern part of Tilly, and had cut the St Pierre road. At the same time 49th Division, on the left of the battalion, had been advancing south alongside the advance of 50th Division. They suffered twenty-four casualties during the day, and pulled back to the north-east of the town for the night.

6th DLI had, meanwhile, atacked up the road that they had suffered on on June 13th. The attack was almost identical to that of a few days before.

"The enemy gave us a very warm welcome once more and the area of the stream and track from Marcel to Pont de la Guillette were plastered with mortars. Leading Companies, C and D....met heavy machine gun fire from the area of the farm buildings, but the attack was kept moving. B Company round to the right up river, had again to deal with snipers………D Company under Captain Sandwith reached the second cluster of farm buildings and dug in on the left of the track. C Company, under Major Kirby, pushed on much further and reaching the line of the Tilly – Lingeveres road, came into very close contact with the enemy.”
War Diary - 6th Battalion Durham Light Infantry

On the Tilly - Lingevres - Balleroy road, around where Tilly CWGC is today, the Durham's reached the north side of the road to find the German's on the south. A grenade fight took place here, the grenades being thrown from one side of the road to the other. The Durham's dug in short of the road, and were subject to fire from an armoured car overnight.

June 18th:
2nd Essex continued the advance into Tilly-sur-Seulles on the 18th. They were held up by "in-situ tanks" and two companies moved east to outflank these. Another company advancing on the west side of the Tilly - Bayeux road. The northern half of the town was in British hands by nightfall, and the battalion had lost twenty-eight casualties in the street-fighting. A patrol sent out during the night clashed with the enemy, and another two men were lost.

Early on June 19th, it was observed that the German's were shelling the southern part of the town. This was taken as a sign that the enemy had fallen back, and the CO of the Essex pushed his men on to occupy the rest of Tilly. By 14:00 on June 19th, Tilly-sur-Seulles was in British hands.

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Cor, bloody hell. That's taken me all day. And I now I've rambled in places, and that no-one will ever read it because of its simply daunting size. And yeah yeah, I'm sure there are spelling mistakes glore. But oh well. And apologies for the crap maps aswell. I might get round to posting some pictures later, but at the moment my eyeballs are bleeding and I fear if I hear the word "Tilly" again, I may have a cardiac I'm off to relax.

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Sources:

Books:
12th SS - Hubert Meyer
Gold Beach; Battlezone Normandy - Simon Trew
Gold Beach; Inland from King - Christopher Dunphie and Garry Johnson.

War Diaries:
XXX Corps
8th Armoured Brigade
4th/7th DG
24th Lancers
50th Division
151st Infantry Brigade
8th DLI
6th DLI
69 Infantry Brigade
7th Armoured Divison
131st Infantry Brigade
22nd Armoured Brigade
1st Rifle Brigade
4th CLY
5th RTR
56th Infantry Brigade
2nd Glosters
2nd Essex

Copyright Mat 2005

Many have said that the desert rats were not the force they were in the desert, that an old soldier is a cautious soldier and thats why he is still alive. There is probably some truth in there, but why then did the 7th
perform brillianty for the rest of the campaign in Europe, if the rank and file had had enough?

Of course, like the Americans they had in this part of the sector, bocage. They had come from the deserts back to blighty and based in Norfolk, now thats not a great place to be based if your heading for Normandy.

Captain John Sterling 4/7th Dragoon Guards

If ever a pice of country was ideal for defense by tanks and a nightmare for them to attack in, it was Normandy in summer. The countryside is so like England. Luxuriant green grass and foliage. Tall, thick hedges bounding small pasture fields, little sunken lanes with grassy banks, clumps of grey stone buildings forming a farm or a village. A delightful spot for a picnic, but a deathtrap for an invading army. In this cover a tank ora gun could hide completely and bide its time. You only became aware of its existence when your leading tank went up in flames, and often several more went up before you had any exact idea of the posistion. It was difficult to see to shoot more than a few hundred yards. Instead of tanks picking a posistion to a flank and sitting there shooting while the infantry went forward, now they had to go forward side by side with the infantry and were duly picked off.

Mat thats brilliant thank you for doing that, hopefully it will show some that there was more to that sector and time frame than just bloody Villers. It needs to be long to explain, im missing out so much so thanks again and those maps are great.

Now if you get fed up with loading songs on to that mp3 player what about Epsom?

Just kidding mate

Andy

Just to clarify, Wild Oats would have involved the dropping of 1st British Airborne Division - but not on Villers Bocage itself. Perch was the codename for the original armoured move to Villers Bocage and the seizure of Point 213.

1st Airborne would have been dropped in the area around Evrecy and Esquay. Just a wee bit south of Hill 112 and the Odon Valley - in fact, the Hill and the large open fields there may well have been intended as a DZ (pure speculation on my part).

51st Highland were supposed to cut the road east and south-east of Caen. 7th Armoured would advance up the Villers-Bocage - Caen highway, and link with 1st Airborne who would probably be in possession of the high ground, and the Orne crossings (again, pure speculation as to 1st Airborne's objectives - now that I think about it, there's probably an Operation Order in the 1st AB war-diary). Because the Orne bridgehead was under pressure and was far from completely secure, 51st Highland were unable to get going. In any event, I Corps and Monty clearly felt that any further movement out of the Orne bridgehead was foolhardy until it was more secure.


Yes, I've noticed that happen in books aswell. They discuss the landings, and then kind of leave things for a bit, and then mention how Montgomery lost his last chance for manouver at Villers after a detailed description of 7th Armoured being pulverised by Michael Wittman (they give the impression of him shooting up an entire Division!). Yet they seem to forget what happened inbetween. Sometimes you may hear how the Canadian advance got blighted at Buron and Authie on June 7th, but hear little of the great defensive victories the Canadians won at Norrey and Bretteville (battles in which the much vaunted 12th SS Pz displayed some frankly amateurish tactics).

But I think those initial XXX Corps battles are a good way of studying how the nature of the Battle of Normandy changed in the face of enemy resistance. How the initial plan for armoured thrusts inland by D+4 got slowed down as first 12th SS arrived, and then Panzer Lehr. There were a lot of casualties suffered that first week.

EDIT: Some may notice that in the above large post, I left out what 231st Brigade were up to during this period. Well, they were the furtherst west British force (until 7th Armd moved round there to get to Villers on June 12th). They were involved in pushing down from Bayeux, astride the Aure river. There was some heavy fighting around the crossroads at La Belle Epine, and of course they had to maintain contact with the US V Corps on their right flank. The reason I left them off was simply because I have no information about them. All the info I have stems from when I was researching the fighting at Tilly-sur-Seulles, and 231st Brigade were a few miles from the town.

Thanks guys for the clarification. Tons of reading still to do on this thread and links.

Now about Epsom

Yea sorry its gone quiet on this front, been a wee bit busy but will be posting again soon

Andy

Of course when talking about Caen, the Canadians were battling away just as hard and for a great look into what was going on here is a Canadian view which mentions many of the battles they took part in

By H Clifford Chadderton

For war amps of Canada (I like his first bit in regards to SPR)

http://www.waramps.ca/video/opch.pdf


Also

http://www.valourandhorror.com/DB/ISSUE/Caen_strg.php


Andy

Not forgetting the Germans heres the views of Gerhard Rempel

Battle of Caen: The Stalingrad of the Hitler Youth


http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/tours/...ndy/battle.html

If you recall I was at Tilly, I cannot recall going there, or why we were there. But I do recall kneeling with my Bren pointing down the hill. with bits of bodies scattered around me. Try asI may Icannot get that bit back into any sort of sequence. In fact I could still go to the place where I was, even today, for Tilly had a slight rise in the street and I was at the top of that rise.
Brian

I think you can be forgiven Brian. It must have been chaotic (understatement) for those of you in the midst of the fighting.

I forget just how many times Tilly changed hands? One thing I can recall, there was not much of it left. tank battlle raged. I have several photos of Tilly as it is now, sunk back into a quiet little Normandy town again. There is not a lot of evidence left of what took place there. There is a small monument in the Churchyard.

In fact a pal of mine went all the way across to Normandy just to take photo's. he said you would not know that there had been fierce battles that took place there.

Just as well.
Brian

You could have been there towards the end of July Brian, after Goodwood. I think I'm right in thinking that the 3rd Division were involved in Operation Bluecoat, so you may have been in that area prior to that attack.

Here's some pics of Tilly-sur-Seulles...


Here's the main road from Bayeux, looking north from the crossroads in the centre of the town. The road leading off to my right is the east road, that crosses the Seulles and enters St Pierre. St Pierre is about 500m away off to my right.


This one's rather out of focus - I was probably rushed because I was stood in the middle of the road. I'm looking South. The main road I'm stood on runs from Bayeux to Juvigny - the latter being over the crest of the hill at the far end, where the road disappears. The main crossroads are where the road dips before climbing again.

I'm sure I've read somewhere that Tilly changed hands 22 times! Remarkable, especially considering the space between the first attack and the final attack was about nine to eleven days! I can't recall where I read that, but I have my doubts over the figure I must admit, purely because for all I've read I can only find reference to it being partially captured once by the Glosters prior to the final set of attacks by the Essex. Although the Essex withdrew a couple of times at night during the final set of attacks over the 17th - 19th. Does this constitute the village changing-hands? Perhaps. Also the village of St Pierre - it's so close (yet so far) from Tilly I wonder if it has been included in the changed-hands figure? There is one day, June 12th, when I'm certain there was an attack on the town but which I haven't checked yet. The Queens Regiment may have captured the town on this day for all I know, but they weren't there the next day. I'm just thinking out loud really

It may be one of those things we'll never know for certain.

Much of what I recall, is that the little town was a vision of hell on earth. My position was at the top of the rise, on the right handside of the road, looking down the rise, on what was originally a window frame (Never seen the photo like yours mate) The little place now, is nothing like it was in 1944, for a start there was precious little standing, and what was there was full of shell holes.
Tilly was a very dangerous place. mines, booby traps, shelling, mortaring, snipers....The complete hell hole.

What I do find surprising? is how little evidence there remains, according to my friends description. But that is what I find with all the old battle areas,They have chnaged out of all recognition...All of them, Bart "Bless Him" taking the route that I followed in Holland, was a prime example. Everything has changed, bu aftr 60 years "A life time" who would be surprised?
Brian

Touching on the 7th armoured div again and why this very experienced div took some adjusting to life in Normandy. Robin Neillands makes some good points I feel, apart from the obvious that this division had already seen alot of fighting in Africa and Italy, whats the old adage? An old soldier is a cautious soldier.
Also the 7th were probably having similar problems to what the Americans were complaining about, Bocage, especially after fighting in the open desert. But as many British Normandy vets have said, 'we all had bocage and you just had to get on with it', so the 7th cant really fall back on that. Many of the men from the 7th AD and the 51st had been involved in battles where one moment they were chasing the Germans and the next they were pulling back, 3 years of hard fighting.

"Then they had come back home to the UK for the invasion, relaxed for a while (and wouldnt you after 3 years of fighting). The married men returned to their families and saw how their children had grown up.
Many of the single men had got married. Life had looked good and hopeful for a while but now they were sent back to battle and that rosey future was at risk. Again it is hardly surprising if many of these men felt, to quote one 7th armoured veteran " We had done our bit and a bit besides, in the desert and in Italy.... We thought it was time for some other bugger to have a go".

But as Neillands points out, there are no absolutes in war, as the 50th division (another that had seen action)
was one of the best in Normandy. I know some have asked why then use these divisions, again hindsight is great, and a 50th div vet I chatted to had the theory and said that it was thought at the time, if the invasion had gone pear shaped (badly) and the allied armies had to be pulled out, these experienced divs could be relied on to hold the Germans off while it took place. Pretty much like Brians 3rd division did during 1940 as part of the BEF.

Neillands says

"Those who survive these early encounters become useful soldiers, battle hardened is the phrase for their new condition, men who know the difference between what is dangerous and what is merely frightening. These men know how to fight and win in war and they will continue in that useful condition for a while. But in time, inevitably, their determination wanes. Too much exposure to danger, too many lost friends, too many terrible sights, eventually sap the will to fight. Rest and relief is essential to keep good soldiers going even this far, but eventually the will for battle declines".

That reminds me of something brian has mentioned a few times before, about his mate who was first class then one day during battle just broke down.

" While rest and relaxation is important this condition can be exacerbated if the soldiers, like those in the old desert formations, are given a prolonged respite at home, amid their loved ones. The will to return to battle is harder to create than the will to remain in battle and going back to war is hard for them and who can blame them? They had indeed done their bit."

Of course blame can be levelled at command and indeed changes were made and these divisions proved their worth later on and to be honest I think the flak levelled at these divs are well over the top given the circumstances and who they were taking on and with what they had to fight with. Taking on the elite of the German army, and, Panthers against lightly armoured fast Cromwells is no even match. But anyone who has read about the battles for and around Tilly which has been mentione in previous posts will know that the British formations did themselves proud and then some.

Andy